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EDWIN M. BORCHAERD
HISTORY AND THEORY (Continued)
The State Cannot be Bound by Law
Having examined the development of the postulate that the
king can do no wrong, as a basis for denying tort responsibility,
it now becomes necessary to examine the alleged justification
both for procedural and substantive immunity found in the argu-
ment that the State cannot be bound by law.
Perhaps the most sterile, yet superficially logical of the sev-
eral reasons advanced for the State's immunity from suit is that
"there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends," an authority which "is itself
superior to" law. The argument in explanation of this thesis is
embodied in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
United States Supreme Court, in the case of Kawananaho v.
Polyblan, 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527 (1907). The
argument reads as follows:
"Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the im-
munity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permis-
sion, but the answer has been public property since before the
days of Hobbes. (Leviathan, c. 26, 2.) A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. Car o p eut bic recevoir loy d'autriy,
mis il est impossible par nature de se donncr loy. Bodin, Re-
publique, 1, c. 8, Ed. 1629, p. 132. Sir John Eliot, De Jure Majes-
tatis, c. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur zecessitave. Baldus., De
Leg. et Const., Digna, Voxc, (2d ed., 1496, fol. 51 b. Ed. 1539, fol.
61."
In another case, he added:
is . ..we must realize that the authority that makes the law
is itself superior to it, and that if it consents to apply to itself the
rules that it applies to others the consent is free and may be
withheld." I
It will not be necessary to prove either the accuracy or inaccu-
racy of this professed syllogism in order to realize that the time
has long since arrived when every civilized community, as many
already do, should by statute consent to be sued and to admit its
The Western Maid, 257 U. S. 419, 432, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 161 (1922).
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pecuniary responsibility for the torts of its agents. But the
statement involves so much political theory that it invites exami-
nation. It may seem strange that authority from the fifteenth,
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, intent on establishing the
absolute supremacy of a secular king over a universal church,
and of an absolute monarch as against popular government or
chaotic particularism, should be invoked to support a legal doc-
trine for a twentieth century democratic republic. Nor does it
seem appropriate to attempt to explain the procedural rule of
immunity from suit by the alleged pre-existing substantive rule of
exemption from law, or legal irresponsibility.2 Immunity from
ordinary suit preceded Plowden's and Coke's rule of irresponsi-
bility and infallibility, and was not derived from it. The his-
torical error of assuming that the English king, certainly
through Bracton's day, was or professed to be above the law
has already been pointed out. In the Austinian sense, favored
by Justice Holmes, the test of a "legal right" fs the existence of
a legal remedy, not the reverse. But in England there was and
is a remedy against the king, the petition of right, which repre-
sents merely a special form of suit. If it has been found de-
sirable in England to adopt a judicial rule that in tort the king
cannot be sued or that for the torts of his agents he is not liable,
this is not because he is above the law, but because he is subject
to a rule of legal privilege in certain matters. It was a judge-
made rule. Law applied to the king, but the rules were neces-
sarily not always identical with those applicable to private indi-
viduals, a principle certainly as old as the Roman law of the
Empire. The absence of constraint or of legal duty is as much
a rule of law as zero is a conceptual number in the mathematical
scale. The former is as indispensable to legal conceptions as
the latter is to mathematics.
But the fact is that the two parts as well as their supposed
connection in the dictum of Justice Holmes, the alleged immunity
from suit arising out of superiority to law, expressed in the form
of a universal and self-evident truth have been challenged
throughout a great part of the civilized world as legally and his-
torically unsound. In continental Europe, whose jurists and
philosophers have an equally profound knowledge of the political
2 It is assumed that when Justice Holmes says "there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right de-
pends," he refers to a substantive "right" and not to the procedural privi-
lege of suing. If he meant "legal right!' to sue, he would probably have
used the common maxim that the state cannot be sued without its consent,
which no one would deny. The historical question in American law is, why,
in view of the general silence of the legislature, with exceptions to be
noted, was refusal rather than consent implied? Continental legal history
had implied consent; English and American, refusal. Justice Holmes at-
tempts a logical explanation of the phenomenon, whereas we believe it de-
mands historical and political investigation.
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and legal theories of Bodin and Hobbes, and many of whom
had a more powerful incentive to maintain the doctrine of an
irresponsible sovereign, no one, so far as we can find, has suggest-
ed either the axiomatic character of procedural immunity from
suit or its alleged analytical explanation. Non-responsibility
for the torts of agents-not immunity from suit-has been ex-
plained or justified on numerous grounds, as will subsequently
be shown, but apparently never except by Justice Holmes on the
ground that the sovereign or the state or the law-maling authori-
ty was above the law. Indeed, in France, Bodin's home country,
the courts, without invoking any political theory, simply applied
to the State, as a matter of course, with certain qualifications to
be mentioned hereafter, article 1384 of the ,Civil Code, making
the principal responsible for certain torts of his agents. In
Germany, since the early Middle Ages, the same rule has pre-
vailed. Far from repudiating the doctrine, its implications
have been continually extended, not only by the courts but by the
legislation of most of the countries of Europe and of the British
colonies. While, moreover, the doctrine may be "logical" that
the authority that makes the law is above the law, it can hardly
be called "practical" either in this or more autocratic days.
Had any sovereign professed to act on such a theory, invoking
the authority of Bodin and Hobbes, he would soon have found
it most dangerous and impractical; three centuries of historical
development have shown that the absolute power of any sov-
ereign is a bit of political theology.- It is believed, therefore,
that to rest the immunity from suit on so unsubstantial a foun-
dation involves both a "formal conception" and an "obsolete
theory." The demonstration will be attempted. Before enter-
ing upon it, we may be pardoned the remark that it seems
strange that a mind so emancipated as that of Justice Holmes
should, in respect of such an abstraction as sovereignty, adhere
to the fundamentalist metaphysics of the seventeenth century.
No judge in the United States has exhibited a more enlightened
3 No one better than Justice Holmes has shown that logic plays a rle
secondary to experience in the development of the law. See, for example,
the following passage: ". -.. other tools are needed besides logic... . The
life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt nece-
sities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy . . . had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determin-
ing the rules by -which men should be governed." Comukiox Lxw (1881) 1;
see also The Path of the Law, reprinted in COLLEOTED LErML PAPMS (1921)
180-181; the penetrating article of Dewey, commenting on several of the
statements of Justice Holmes: Logfcal Method and Law (1924) 10 Corn.
L. Q. 17, 21; Isaacs, How Lawycrs Thinh (1923) 23 COL. L. llv. 555;
Rottschaefer, Legal Theory and the Practice of Law (19206) 10 MImu. L.
REv. 382, 387.
4 On political theology in the theory of sovereignty, see ScHur=-, POLz-
TISCRE THEoLoGm (1922) C. 3.
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liberalism and statesmanship in the application of the police
power and in the delimitation of the sphere of federal and state
action. No one has manifested a more subtle appreciation
of the experimental nature of all political arrangements, includ-
ing forms of government, and of the psychological forces which
motivate social action. It is therefore the more surprising that
analytical formulae respecting such chameleonic concepts as
sovereignty and law should obtain so complete a command over
so virile and flexible a mind.
An adequate consideration of the various articles of the
Holmesian dogma in question would require an analysis, legal,
historical, philosophical and sociological, of the conceptions of
sovereignty, State, and law and of the relations between and
among them. The most superficial examination of the problems
involved discloses wide differences among political theorists and
publicists in every age in their definitions and conceptions of
all three terms-to say nothing of their divergent avenues of ap-
proach. It will often be found that polemics on conflicting
theory rest upon variations in fundamental postulates and major
premises, elaborated by a process of deductive reasoning. Sov-
ereignty, which to Austin was a reality, is to the moderns mainly
an abstraction. The State itself is to many publicists a formal
onception, defying legal analysis. Yet some profit may be
found in surveying the historical development of these concep-
tions, as exemplified in the writings of some of their major ex-
ponents, to see to what extent, if at all, they serve to illuminate
the problem under examination.
SOVEREIGNTY, STATE AND LAW
The search for the source of power in political life is never-
ending. The effort to justify power has almost as long a history.
Out of those incentives grew the doctrine of sovereignty, as we
now know it. Political theory is usually the outcome of political
facts and needs, and Machiavelli and Bodin had grounds for de-
manding a highly centralized State and government. But as
political facts and needs have changed since the day when the
Politiques and Bodin sought to assert the power of Henry IV of
France against the demands of the Pope and of conflicting re-
ligious sects and local particularism in France, and when Hobbes
sought to justify the unlimited, absolute and indivisible power
of Charles I as against the Commons, so the doctrine of sov-
ereignty, invented to support those secular claims, has experi-
enced mutations and vicissitudes which might well have exter-
minated a less hardy perennial. From a personal monarch, this
supreme power has migrated to that "intangible, invisible and
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immutable" entity, body or association s called the State, though
it is and probably will remain uncertain whether "popular sov-
ereignty" is equivalent to State sovereigntyG and whether it is
proper to speak of the organs of government as possessing
"sovereign" powers.7  Indeed, though Hobbes' definition re-
quired sovereignty to be indivisible, to justify an ultimate source,
the federal state and the uncertain nature of popular majorities,
has seriously impaired if not destroyed that conception. 8 It is,
for example, hard to say where sovereignty in a country like the
United States is to be found, unless we say that "the people"
are sovereign-a political rather than a legal conception., We
5 Mathews, J., in Poinde xter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 290, 5 Sup. Ct
903, 914 (1884); see MACIVER, Tim MODERN STATE (1926) 9.
6 MIERRIAzi, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1900) c. 6; DUN-
NING, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES FROM ROUSSEAU TO SPENCER (1920)
c. 1; GETTELL, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1924) 9, 68, 121, 136, 258,
296, 391, 400; Laski, The Theory of Popular Sovcreignty (1919) 17
MICH. L. REV. 201; LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOTREIGNTY (1921) 209.
It seems consistent to indicate by words the difference between society as a
whole and the State, one associational aspect, for governmental purposes,
of that society or community. Organized for governmental purposes, it
must necessarily be closely identified with law. It possesses law-maliing
and law-enforcing machinery. But it does not create all the law, for
much of it is a historical development of centuries. Once consider the State
an organ of society, and it becomes difficult to consider it above the law,
for no "organ" or "authority" or "machinery" in any modern community
is "above" the law, even though wide powers be exercised by or conferred
upon it.
7 MAcIv~R, op. cit. svzpra note 5, at 11-13, suggests gradations or stages
of sovereignty in the State analogous to the gradations of power in a busi-
ness corporation. He suggests that the "general will" of or for the State
is represented in the great body of people, most of whom take no interest
in government, but realize their association in the community (the share-
holders); he regards the "ultimate sovereign" as the group among the peo-
ple who determine policy or direction, even though only the majority of
them controls (the voting shareholders) ; he regards the "legislative sover-
eign" or "government" as the executive and administrative body (the board
of directors) making laws, exerting force in their maintenance and assur-
ing order, subject to the control of the "ultimate sovereign" and the preS-
sure of that tradition whose support is the "general will."
sLAs T, GRApiAAR OF POLITICS (1925) 45; Jenks, Sources of the Law
(1924) 59 LAw JOURNAL, 666; MIACIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 467; but
see WILLOUGHBY, THE FuNDA=NTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW (1924) 183
et seq.
9 Ritchie, On the conception of sovereignty (1S91) 1 ANNxALS OF THE ArIsn.
AcAD. oF POL. AND SOC. SCIENCE, 407; MERRIAM, op. cit. supra note 6, at
156; WILLOUGHBY, op. Cit. supra note 8, at 99, 112; Poindexter v. Greenhow,
loe. cit. supra note 5; BIACIVER, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 6. To the sociologist,
any understanding of political sovereignty requires a social-psychological
analysis of the conflicts of parties, groups and classes in the community.
See Commons, A Sociological View of Sovercignty (1899-1900) 5 AzuIn.
JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY, 155, 347, 544, 683, 814; (1900) 6 ibid. 67; WxLmms,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1920) c. 1.
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have not that need for a strong centralized government, which
once made the question of sovereignty seem important. The
speculations of publicists as to the source of ultimate power-
physical and legal are usually not distinguished-are generally
designed to promote a particular propaganda. This explains
and discounts the conflicting views of writers like Bodin, Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau; and while partial validity may attach to
their several theses, self-evident truths are to be found in none
of them. Perhaps most of these publicists were more interested
in asserting their explanation or justification for the ideal State
as they would have it than for any State they saw in existence
before them.10
Austin, who seems to have been as much opposed to the vari-
ous contractual theories of political organization as were Hegel,
and other critics of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, regarded
the sovereign and the State as synonymous.1' Many writers, in-
cluding Hobbes, held that the king or the government or the rul-
ing body, is the State. Austin's sovereign in England included
the "King, peers and the electoral body of the commons," 12 as
representing that "determinate human superior" issuing com-
mands which alone have the character of law, and whose sov-
ereignty is recognized by the fact that it owes obedience to no
other like superior, and in turn receives "habitual obedience from
the bulk of a given society." 13 Though Austin's definition of
law as an enforced command presumably denies the character of
law to customary law and judge-made law 4 and is therefore
10 See GIDDINGS, THE RESPONSIBLE STATE (1918) 36: "In all the dic-
tionaries there is no other word than this noun 'sovereignty' that has more
disastrously been conjured with by the metaphysical juggler . . . Jurists
and political theorists, losing sight of concrete fact, gave their minds to
abstractions and wasted disquisition upon conceptual distinctions. And
sovereignty became for political science a thing that never was on sea or
land." See also MAcIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 14.
11 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1869) 227, 249.
12 Ibid. 253.
13 Criticisms of the Austinian theory will be found in the following works:
BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901) 503; WILLOUGHBY,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 122, though on the whole Willoughby accepts Aus-
tin's analytical reasoning; LASKI, op. cit. supra note 8, at 50-55; SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) Appendix II, p. 524; GREEN, LECTURES ON
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1921) c. F. See the vigorous
criticism in 1 ROGUIN, LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE PURE (1923) 1-55; and the
view of Giddings that those who speak of sovereignty as do Hobbes and
Austin are "metaphysicians." THE RESPONSIBLE STATE (1913) 38. 11e at-
tacks especially the notion that the sovereign, whoever that is, "compels"
obedience. Cf. AcIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, cc. 1, 2, 16.
14 Austin's effort, in Lecture 1, op. cit. supra note 11, to establish custom
as positive law only when it is transmuted into a judicial decision, is un-
satisfactory, for much custom, enforced by societal agents, never is ju-
dicially challenged. The suggestion that what the sovereign permits he
commands, an Austinian rationalization, is characterized by Jenks, op. cit.
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inadequate, and while his view of the English sovereign has been
called by high authority "opposed not only to law, but also to
history," 11 both views have nevertheless exerted a powerful
influence on legal thought in England and America in narrow-
ing the conception of "law" more strictly than in other coun-
tries. luch of the controversy as to the possibility of legal
limitations on governing authority lies in the disputed content
of the term "law." 16
Based upon the Hobbesian assumption that sovereign power is
essential in every state, that it is indivisible, unlimited and illim-
itable, a whole school of jurists in recent years has attacked the
notion of state sovereignty as a relic of metaphysical political
theology and of supernatural mysticism.17 They undertake to
supra note 8, as a "quibble." To call a rule established by a particular ju-
dicial decision as "in effect legislation," and thus a "command" is to apply
loosely the superior-inferior relation. This is not to deny that it is useful
to give the term law a precise definition, if that can still at this late day
be done. It seems a mistake to endeavor to over-simplify what is complex,
or not to recognize that the term "law" embraces numerous conceptions.
Perhaps the best defense of Austin's labored effort to bring custom whenjudicially enforced and judge-made law within his narrow definition is to
be found in WMLOUGHBY, op. cit. sztpra note S, at 134-144. In Germany,
the adherents of ruler-sovereignty, who deduce all law from the will of the
sovereign, maintain that custom is not law, but only becomes so through
recognition by the sovereign as customary law. SEYDEL, Gnu.4DziJ= Enmtn
ALLGEmrINEN STAATSLEHRE (1875) 10, 13. But is it not a fiction to sup-
pose that the sovereign knows all the sources of law? There is a modifi-
cation of the ruler theory which asserts that only when the legislator recog-
nizes it expressly or tacitly, does custom become a source of law. Sc2
HAFF, GRUNDLAGE EINER K6RPERSCHAFTSTHEORIE (1915) 52 et aeq. Jher-
ing and Jellinek are not far from Austin in their view of custom. See the
criticism of their doctrines by Duguit in MODERN FreNCH LEGAL PHiLOSo-
PHY (1916) 30S et seq. Cf. G.Amis, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCMINCn Or LAW
(1911) § 8.15 BRYCE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 538. See also McKEcrNi, Tun STATE
AND THE INDIVIDUAL (1896) c. 10.
16 Cf. WMLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 129, and infra, on the doctrine
of auto-limitation.
17 The principal publicists who have participated in this attack are Du-
guit, Krabbe and Laski. Their views will be found in the following worhs:
DuGur: L'ETAT, LE DROIT OBSECTIF Er LA LOI OSITIVE (1901); TzMUT DO
DROrr CONSTTrrUTIONAL (2d ed. 1921-25) esp. I, 403 et seq. and II, 93 et scq.;
LES TRANSFORMATIONS GN9RALES DU DROIT PUBLIC (1913) (Laski's transl.
1919, under the title LAW IN THE MODrxN STATE) esp. c. 1.
Expositions and interpretations of Duguit's theories: Mathews, A Rcccnt
Development in Political Theoy (1909) 24 POL. So. QUAI. 284; Elliott, The
Metaphysics of Duguit's Pragmatic Conception of Law (1922) 37 PoL. So.
QUA. 639; Brown, The Jursp,"dwncc of M. Dguit (1910) 32 L. Q. It v.
168; see also Coker, Pluralistic Theories in BlERRiAzi & BUMNS, A HIsr0rx"
op POLITICAL THEORiEs (1924) c. 3; BONNAlRD, IA CONCEPTION JUM~iQOUD DR
L'ETAT (1922) 35 et seq. (reprint from REVUE Du DnoiT PUBLIc, 1922) and
in I REv. INT. DE L-A. THEORM DU Dorr (1926) 18; Kunz, 1 ibid. 140; l4E:-
ZEL, 1 OSTERREICHISCHE ZTSCHR. F. OFF. RECHT (1914) 114.
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show not only that sovereign power is an evanescent, intangible
quality difficult if not impossible to locate in the modern consti-
tutional state, but that its divisibility and limited character, if
there is such a thing as sovereignty, are proved by the federal
state and the constitutional division of powers.18 Nor is this
argument fully refuted by pointing out Hobbes' failure to dis-
tinguish political or practical or de facto from legal or de jure
sovereignty. When a theory no longer corresponds to facts it
seems profitless to insist on its validity; and these modern ideal-
ists, pointing out the fact that the State is only one of the many
groups or associations to which the individual attaches his social
and even political allegiance and that the State, while possibly the
most important of these associations, would not dare to inter-
fere with many of the others, reject and repudiate the sovereign-
ty of the State as a historical anachronism or qualify its au-
thority within narrow confines.19 When the courts continually
apply limitations upon the exercise of power by the organs of
the State or community it seems vacuous to argue that while
KRABBE: DIE mODERNE STAATSIDEE (1919) transl. by Sabine and Shepard
as THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE (1922) with valuable introduction by the
translators.
LASKI: PROBLEMIm OF SOVEREIGNTY (1917) c. 1; AUTHORITY IN TIIE MODERN
STATE (1919). c. 1; TIE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1921); review by Sir Frederick Pollock, (1922) 38 L. Q. REV. 242; A
GRAMMuIAR OF POLITICS (1925) c. 2. See also Elliott, The Pragmatic Politics
of H. J. Laski (1924) 18 AMER. POL. Sc. REV. 251; SCIIMITT, POLITISCHiE
THEOLOGIE (1922),
18 An able presentation of the newer conceptions of sovereignty, with an
explanation of the basis for the attack on absolute sovereignty, will be
found in MAcIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 467-79.
19 For discussions of the pluralistic attacks on state sovereignty see GET-
TELL, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1924) c. 29; Coker, The Technique
of the Pluralistic State (1921) 15 AMER. POL. Sc. REV. 186; Sabine,
Pluralism: A Point of View (1923) 17 ibid. 34; Ellis, The Pluralistic State
(1920) 14 ibid. 393; FOLLETT, THE NEW STATE (1920) cc. 28-32. One of
the main pluralists is J. N. Figgis. See his CHURCHES IN THE MODERN
STATE (2d ed. 1914); STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO
GROTIUS (2d ed. 1923).
The State does deal with matters of common interest, so far as that in-
terest is publicly manifested and clear enough to admit or require recog-
nition or regulation. That alone indicates that most private and corporate
interests are left without state interference or intrusion. A given com-
munity may confer upon or suffer the State to exercise extraordinary
powers, as in Soviet Russia, but this would only indicate that the State's
powers are derivative-in a democratic State from the people or from
those possessing political power,-and that the relations between State and
individual are determined by a human source back of the legal State. The
State thus appears as a community agent for certain purposes, its dis-
tinguishing characteristic being the power to exert compulsion under given
circumstances. See Lindsay, The State in Recent Political Theory (1914)
1 POL. QUAR. 128.
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sovereignty is legally unlimited its exercise is limited.0 Be-
tween abstract power and rights and the legal exercise of power
and rights the law makes no substantial distinction. And if one
wishes to argne that supreme power-political sovereignty-is
necessarily unlimited by "law," the answer is that the lawyer,
the government and the citizen are interested in "legal sov-
ereignty,"-applied power-which by its very terms limits by
law the highest authorities in the State; and that the definition
of the limiting term "law," in the sense of positive law, as a com-
mand by sovereign to subject, is too narrow for any useful or
practical purpose. Nor is arbitrary coercive power, internally,
an attribute of sovereignty in a developed State. The consti-
tution and the law, rather, determine when force may be exerted.
Justice Holmes might better have cited Austin as authority for
his assertion, which might then more correctly have read: the
supreme political sovereign-if such a determinate person or
body can be located in any State--is not limited by a positive
law issuing from the legislature in the form of a command.
Perhaps this is logically true if we accept as a premise Austin's
original postulate, but it explains none of the workings of prac-
tical government, nor any aspect of political or legal life.
We are interested in the operation of a social institution, and
the moment we speak of operation or the workings of govern-
ment, we find that the power exercised by the State through its
instrumentalities is for the most part very definitely limited
by law. The "State" itself represents a legal concept. Here
we are dealing with legal authority, legal power, legal "sov-
ereignty," which is exercised under social and constitutional-
and therefore legal-restictions ascertainable and interpreted
by societal agents-usually, though not always, the courts. Who
is the political sovereign, "the power behind the throne" in our
existing political organizations, is a question for the social psy-
chologist, the politician, the sociologist. As John Chipman Gray
says, "the real rulers of a political society are undiscoverable." 21
As an intangible body, they escape legal control. As a tangible
body, or as a governing body, whose relations to the other mer-
bers of society are fixed by a constitution, they do not. The
only escape from this conclusion, it would seem, is to deny the
character of law to a constitution, and to that extreme Austin
and his followers are driven.22  We shall recur to this point in
discussing the possibility of legal limitations on the State. But
when Justice Holmes derives from the legally unfettered political
sovereign the justification for the assertion that the "authority
20See the e-xcellent discussion of this professed distinction in WIE-
LOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 9.
2 1 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1921) 79; see MAcIEE
op. cit. supra note 5, c. 6.
22 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 83 et scq.
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that makes the law"--a legal sovereign-is equally unlimited
by law, he can hardly intend to convey so, for us, unconstitutional
and therefore unlegal an impression. "Possibly all that was
meant was that a statute does not necessarily bind the legisla-
ture when directed to private individuals, a statement which
may be accepted; 23 in that event, the term "law" in the maxim
of Justice Holmes is not always used in the same sense. If Mr.
Zane was mistaken in his interpretation of Justice Holmes'
alleged "heresy" 24 by erroneously assuming that the latter had
asserted that "no law can create a legal right against the govern-
ment," as Willoughby explains,25 nevertheless it may be said
that the "authority that makes the law" is juridically the legis-
lative department of the government, and as Holmes does not
distinguish the legal and the political sovereign, Zane has some
justification for his supposed error. Moreover, it is believed
that Justice Holmes shares the Austinian view that the relation
between the government (legal sovereign) and the private citi-
zen is not strictly speaking, "legal." 20 Yet Justice Holmes in
many notable decisions has helped to strengthen the universal
conviction that the American government and its agents have
limited powers-and apart from the narrow field of so-called
political acts-are subject to judicial, hence legal, control. All
he probably meant to say was that the law-making authority
could, within constitutional (and politically expedient) limits,
shape the rules of law as it saw fit and exempt from the opera-
tion of a particular statute or rule of law a part or even the
whole of the community as a group. It seems unnecessary to
have encumbered so undisputed and probably indisputable a
proposition with a doubtful and challengeable explanation found-
ed on the exotic authority of medieval political philosophers hav-
ing in view .an absolute medieval personal ruler.
23 Most political theorists would probably deny that the legislature is not
bound by its own statutes. See MACIVER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 478.
The phrase is, indeed, ambiguous.
24 Zane, A Legal Heresy (1918) 13 ILL. L. Ruv. 431. Justice Holmes
makes it clear that he is not confining his dictum to the political sovereign,
for the next sentence to that above quoted from Kawananakoa v. Poly-
blank, 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527, (relating to the territory
of Hawaii). reads as follows:
"As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined
to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but na-
turally is extended to those that in actual administration originate and
change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons
within the jurisdiction derive their rights."
2 5 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 81.
26 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 79 et seq.; (1922) 31 YALE LAW JouR-
NAI, 879, 880.
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THE STATE
Just as the doctrine of sovereignty is thus believed to have
been shown to be neither necessary nor especially useful, owing
to the uncertainty of its definition and nature, so it is believed
that no great value from a legal point of view attaches to that
other abstraction, the State. Does it apply equally to the Brit-
ish Empire, Canada, India, Scotland, the United States, the state
of New York, the territory of Hawaii, the District of Columbia,
the Greek city-state? Justice Holmes suggests that the advan-
tages of immunity from suit because of superiority to law must
extend "to those [powers] that, in actual administration, orig-
inate and change at their will the law of contract and property
from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights."
Then surely the immunity ought to apply to the District of Co-
lumbia 27 and to municipal corporations, though we kmow it does
not. Far more convincing is Chief Justice Jay's dictum in Chis-
holm v. Georgia 2S that he could see no theoretical difference be-
tween a suit against the forty thousand citizens of Philadelphia
and the fifty thousand citizens of Delaware. And who or what
is the State? Is it the people organized as a political society, is
it the citizens only, is it the monarch, is it the governors or gov-
ermment (the executive, legislature and judiciary), is it the
Marxian ruling class, is it the territory and the people, is it the
social, legal or psychological organization or association, or all
or some of these together! There is no agreement. At least it
is a name for a collective concept. Kelsen,LO Jellinek, 2:
Thoma,3' and Dowdall 2 identify more than a dozen definitions
27 Metropolitan R. Rt. v. Dist. of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 10
(1889).
282 Dail. 419,472 (U. S. 1793).
29ALLGEIE STAATSLEMRE (1925) 3. See also Das W]csn des Staatc
(1926) 1 REV. INT. DE Lk TH2om Du DRoiT, 5.
so AILaEmNE STAATSLEHRE (1900) 115-120.
317 HANDW6RTEnBUCH DER STAATSWISSENSCHAFTEN (4th ed. 192G) s. V.
Staat, p. 726. See a criticism of the more prominent conceptions of the
State by Pitamic, (1926) 1 REV. INT. DE LA TH90RMU u Dnos, 47.
32 The Ward 'State' (1923) 39 L. Q. Rav. 93. The origin of the word as
applicable to the modern political organization known as the State is shrouded
in doubt. It had been thought that it traced its origin to Ulpian's Pblicum
jus est quod ad statuma rei Romanew spectat. Down to the six-teenth century,
the common word was respubica, commonwealth, GcmciU2Lzcscfl. State, as-
sociated with status, has been regarded as e.x\plaining an existing condition.
Probably the more correct explanation is to be found in ILICHulYEL,'S
PRn CE (1513) in which he speaks of lo stato del Principe, in the sense of
the estate, or dominiumn of the Prince. He also begins his work with the
words "Tutti gli stati . . . sono o repudbbliche o principati." The word
thus passed into common use in western Europe to designate a common-
wealth-stato, 6tat, staat, state-though it may have lost some of its pro-
prietary connotation and emphasized the characteristics of inipcrium,., not
any longer interchangeable with dominium.
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of the State. For our purposes, it is believed proper to use the
term descriptively to designate a politically and legally or-
ganized autonomous society or community.3 3 Equally great dif-
ferences are to be found in determining the nature of the politi-
cal society in question, depending upon the point of view of the
scientist, whether lawyer, sociologist or psychologist. For the
lawyer, the main interest has centered about the issues whether
or not the State is the sole creator of law, whether it is an or-
ganism, including the questions of personification, of the so-called
"juristic person," and of the legal relations between the State
and its members.
Organismic Theory. The complex nature of the phenomenon
known as the State, groups of individuals organized under varied
social and political forms, naturally gives opportunity for various
points of view in describing its nature, scope and functions. As
its most obvious characteristic is the fact that it is composed of
human beings, it is not unnatural that analogies to living or-
ganisms should be sought in order to explain and justify it. The
comparison of the State to a living organism can be traced back
to Plato and Cicero, and we know that the "personality" of the
fiscus or Treasury was accepted in the Roman law. Hobbes'
Leviathan was an artificial man. In modern times, the anthro-
pomorphic analogy was largely employed by political thinkers
to justify their own preconceptions of the relation between the
State and its individual members, or between ruler and ruled,
as incidental to the persistent conflict between authority and
liberty. Moreover, the idea of the State as a conscious, delib-
erate creation of man, by contract, to subserve individual and
social ends, promoted but not originated by Rousseau and his
followers, was combatted by those who saw in the State an
evolutionary product of nature. This revival of the organismic
theory is largely due to the writers of the German Idealist school
(primarily Fichte and Hegel) after the French Revolution.
They insisted upon the strong State as a contrast to the dis-
ruptive tendencies of popular sovereignty, and exalted the State
as an ethical unity, representing an ideal "will" and the embodi-
ment of the moral spirit of the community. The relation of
33 Austin's several uses of the term State indicate his own uncertainty.
He prefers to identify the term with the sovereign person or body which
bears the supreme power in an independent political society. This is now
an unusual use of the term. Matthew Arnold's definition, "the nation in
its collective and corporate capacity" corresponds more closely with the
modern definitions. Dowdall, op. cit. supra note 32, at 123. MacIver's
more elaborate definition may be commended, if a definition of so complicated
a concept is at all wise or feasible: "The state is an association which,
acting-through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end
with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated
the universal external conditions of social order." Op cit. supra note 5, at
22.
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popular to monarchical government was expressed in psychologi-
cal terms and physiological metaphors, as part of the effort to
harmonize governmental authority with human freedom. The
development and growth of the State was compared with the
psychical and physiological growth of the human being. With
the development of biological science in the nineteenth century
this movement gained impetus. Bluntschli even attributed mas-
culinity to the State.
With the development of sociology as a science, the State as
a social organism came to be described in physical and biologic
terms. Social impulses were studied and theories advanced as
to the social and individual purposes of political organization
(Comte, Spencer, Worms). The individualists, like Spencer
and Mill, attributed only a limited function to the State and
found its justification in the promotion of individual ends.21
The State was deemed merely an organization of the group, in-
deed, only one aspect of its legal organization, not an end in it-
self; and the function of politics was to enhance the advantages
to be enjoyed by the individual in group life. The social and
moral justification of kf.issez faire found its expression in politi-
cal and economic democracy. The State was merely a peace-
maker and mediator among conflicting individual interests. The
military and proprietary theory of sovereignty and the State,
espoused by Austin and others, was discredited by the organic
school; and though differences between biological and social evo-
lution were later pointed out, the influence of the school in re-
garding the State as both a natural and a voluntary association
whose justification was the promotion of individual well-being
and whose role should be strictly confined, was marked both in
western Europe and in America. In more recent times, the de-
fenders of the socialist theory, while insisting upon a strong
State, do so only because they claim that Spencerian individual-
ism and laissez-faiie have disproved their beneficence for general
individual well-being, which they also seek under the form of
greater political and economic centralization of group power.
However valuable scientifically the various organismic theories
have been, they have been essentially idealistic and metaphoric.
They have been used generally to explain the writer's political or
social preferences. The State is not a living organism, and
while historical evolution may explain its forms and structure,
34 The sociological theories of the State and their relation to political
theory are best described in the excellent book by BxEs, SoCIOLoGY AaD
POLITICAL THEORY (1924). On the various organismic theories, see Cox=,
ORGANismsIc THEORIES OF THE STATE (1910); ALRTV.7G, Dnr STUT AX.S On-
GA lSmUS (1922); SANDER, STAAT UND RECIT (1922) c. 4. See also DuN-
NING, and GETrELL, c. 25, op. cit. supra note 6; SrEcER, THE Pnm rxcLs OF
SOCIOLOGY (1877-97); GIDDINGS, THE PR iNcpLES OF SOCIOLOGY (189G) and
STUms IN THE THEORY OF Hu mu SOCIETY (1922).
769
YALE LAW JOURNAL
it is to a considerable extent a deliberate, conscious association
of men for the promotion of human well-being. It is not entirely
a rational institution, for man himself is not altogether a rational
being, particularly in his group relations. Various individual
and social impulses explain the organization of the State. What
part fear (Hobbes), consent (Rousseau), habit (Maine) and rea-
son (Bentham) play in the fact that in all forms of the State the
multitude obey the few, no one can say. The obedience is almost
uniformly voluntary, not compulsive. Should the State fail to
subserve the purpose of promoting the social good and should
that fact become generally believed or suspected, doubtless new
forms of association will be devised. The pluralists have already
endeavored to show that man does not exhaust his loyalties by
membership in the State, but that other autonomous associations,
economic, ethical and social, also command his interest and al-
legiance. Certainly the State's function is limited to the control
only of those aspects of individual or group life which materially
affect social or general interests. For the present, however, if
we would continue to use the classical language of abstraction,
the State, as the highest political group and the recognized co-
ercive authority among men, must be reckoned with as the au-
thoritative adjuster of the externally manifested conflicting in-
terests of groups and of individuals in the community, the most
important form of political association, the legal source of physi-
cal power in the community and the guarantor of the reign of
law. Admittedly, the metaphysical element in this compound
leviathan is large.
The State as Force. A number of political philosophers, view-
ing the origin of the State as rooted in conquest, deem the State
the symbol and equivalent of force, and thus outside the law"
This does not reflect actual conditions in any organized communi-
ty, and certainly not in any advanced modern State. While the
State is designed to guarantee the legal and social order, and is
necessarily assigned the use of physical force to prevent dis-
ruption or violation of that order-the distinctive characteristic
of the State as a legal organization-its conceded use of force is
limited to specific purposes, mainly enforcement of law. If it
were conceived as possessing arbitrary power, it would guaran-
tee anarchy, not law or order. As that arbitrary power would
be exerted presumably by state agents, it would be tolerated only
on the theory that it was exerted for lawful purposes or that the
community, the principal, was unable to control or restrain its
35 OPPENHEIMER, THE STATE (1922) preface; BOSANQUET, PHILOSOPHICAL
THEORY OF THE STATE (3d ed. 1920) c. 6 ("The State . . . is neces-
sarily force" p. 140) ; TREITScHKE, PoLITICs (1916) 3 et seq. If law were
derived exclusively from the State, then State and law are separate institu-
tions. Under this premise, Huber posits the possibility of State force with-
out law. RECHT UND RECHTSVERWIRKLICHUNG (1920) 30, 188, 216, 240.
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unruly agent, a condition which could be temporary only. If the
community resorted to arbitrary force, it would indicate revolu-
tion or the temporary break-down of constitutional government
and law. To be sure, legal institutions may be upset by such
force, which then tends to establish a new legal order. Force
persisted in long enough merges into law, just as law unenforced
for a long period ceases to be law. Law, in the common con-
ception of Anglo-American lawyers, thus ultimately implies en-
forcement in some form. But naked and arbitrary force is not
a characteristic of the State, and any State which sought to exert
it regularly would to that extent act unconstitutionally, an ab-
normal and at best temporary condition. Force within the
State is thus subject to review, judicial or political. Only in in-
ternational relations, where the law is in many respects weak,
do States occasionally exert mere force, with community or ma-
jority consent, but even then usually on a profession of moral
or legal right. Internally, however, no State, not even Musso-
lini's, professes to employ naked force without regard to law.-^
The "State Will." What is meant by the will of the State, by
which political thinkers explain State action and the necessity
for subordination of individual wills? Certainly it is not the
actual will of the individual members of the community, nor
Roiisseau's ideal "general" will. Is it the will of the majority,
to which the minority under a social and political convention
must yield? Is it the product of the co-ordinated intelligence of
all, as Bentham contended? Observance of a modern State leads
to the conclusion that the general will is an abstraction, like sov-
ereignty, if not indeed an unsound fiction. We say that States
act and thus express their "will" 3 but in fact only individuals
36 See the criticism of the state as force in HOBHOUSE, THE MULHPIIYSC,%L
THEORY OF THE STATE (1918) 74, 77, 122; Menzel, Z n Problc 'Rcclit und
Macht' (1926) 5 ZErCHRIFT F. OFFENTLICuES RECIuT, 1 (dealing Vith the
subject historically) ; HUBR, op. cit. supra note :35, at 188 ct -cq.; HOCIULNG,
MAN AD THE STATE (1926) c. 5. See a somewhat different approach in
MACIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, c. 7, and KELSEN, ALGEMIN0 STATSLED1UQ
(1925) 17-18, 52.
In this connection, attention may be directed to the interesting analogy
drawn by the noted Viennese scholar, Kelsen,. between God and State in
the thinking of those who posit the superiority of the State to law. Kelsen
argues that State and law are identical. Kelsen shows that the lcgal
doctrine of the omnipotence of the State is strikingly like the theological
doctrine of the omnipotence of God. Each discipline finds the ultimate
source of authority, its First Cause, in State and God respectilely. He
finds an analogy between the alleged voluntary subjection of the State
(sovereignty) to its own laws and the humanizing of God. See the develop-
ment of these theories and postulates in his ALUGEMrENE ST.ATSLEHrM, § 16.
Prof. Pohl published a criticism of Kelsen's professed parallel between God
and State in (1925) 4 ZTSCHER. F. OFFENTL. ]IECHT, 571.
87 So Justice Holmes: "Whatever is enforced by it as law is enforced as
the expression of its will." The Western Maid, sztpra note 1, at 432, 42 Sup.
Ct. at 161.
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have wills. By a convenient fiction and by convention, we re-
gard the will of certain individuals in a legislative body, initiat-
ing legislative action in accepted forms and securing majority
approval, as the "will" of the legislature and, therefore, the
"will" of the State, legally binding on the members of the State.
So with other societal agents, including administrative officers.
The use of the term "will" is entirely unnecessary to the concep-
tion of law, for we are concerned only with a final act or statute,
constitutionally representing the act or enactment of the group
as a whole. "Will" was introduced into the conception by philoso-
phers, eager to find a dynamo or brain, a philosophical "cause"
which pulls the strings inducing action.
The legal source of power in the State is in the body or group
which for the time being constitutes the government, and espe-
cially in the legislative branch, whose decisions are binding, with
or without actual consent, on all members of the State. There
are political ways of bringing about a repeal of those decisions,
but while they stand they constitute law. It is only in a most
qualified sense that the dictum of Justice Holmes, that this legis-
lative authority is not bound by the law it enounces, can be sup-
ported. The difference between Justice Holmes and Mr. Zane
turns mainly on the extent of the qualifications. The legislature
is bound by constitutional limitations and is controllable by the
political "sovereign," through new elections, referenda, etc. In
a broad sense, it is bound by its general laws, like every other
element in the community. Its autonomy in the matter of legis-
lation does not explain why the government, or its constructive
principal, the State, cannot be sued. It may explain, though by
MacIver distinguishes a "general will," the tradition of nationhood or as-
sociational policies which he discovers in the entire group, whether partici-
pating in public affairs or not, from the will of the "ultimate sovereign,"
the articulate part of the community. It is doubtful whether any mental
process, conscious or unconscious, directed toward political ends, actuates
large numbers of any given population, except possibly in time of crisis,
and whether it is proper to speak, even by courtesy, of such a process as
"will." MAcIVER, op. cit. supra note 5, cc. 1, 6. Cf. the penetrating criti-
cism of Bosanquet's and Hegel's theory of the will in Howilouss, op. cit.
supra note 36, c. 4. The various conceptions associated with the term "gen-
eral will" in the sense of common will of the community (Montesquicu,
Rousseau), "will" of the governing officials (Bernatzik, Jellinek), corporate
will expressed through organs (Gierke), the will attributed to a source,
Zurechnungsendpunkt (Kelsen), the distinctions between psychological and
legal will, ruler-will as state power and dictator-for an abstraction, the
State, is incapable of will-(Seydel, Piloty), the objective law as will of
the State, an a priori point of view (Kelsen), are discussed critically, yet
briefly in HAFF, op. cit. supra note 14, at 9, 49 et seq., 92. See, for a criti-
cism of Rousseau's and Austin's conceptions, GREN, loc. cit. supra note 13,
though Green espouses the view that "will" as contrasted with force, is the
basis of the State. Ibid, c. G. See also BOSANQUET, op. cit. supra noto 35,
cc. 5, 6.
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no means convincingly, why the government has thus far re-
fused, in most of our states and in the federal government, to as-
sume responsibility for the official torts of its agents. But it is
not believed that the supposed maxims of Bodin, Hobbes and
Baldus, as will presently be shown, explain the unique American
institution of governmental immunity from suit.
Nor is the State socially that unlimited, irresponsible leviathan
which the analytical school assume. The State has as much
power as society is willing to give it, and no more, for the State
and society are not identical.38 In different nations, the State
performs different functions. In some, it operates the public
utilities, railroad, telegraph, electric power, merchant marine;
in others, it does not. As the State is justified by the functions
it performs and the services it renders to the group and its
members, Duguit and others who have attacked the doctrine of
State sovereignty, characterize it as a public service corpora-
tion. 9 The extent of State power, which is always a trust and
therefore never in fact unlimited, will depend upon the views
of the society, sublimated through governmental organs, as to
how far the common life is enriched or the general good promot-
ed, by entrusting particular powers to the State-or government
-and denying others. Its exercise of power is continually sub-
ject to scrutiny by those for whom it acts. The political sci-
entist, having the political sovereign in mind, thus denies what
the analytical jurist, with the government in mind, insists upon,
namely, the a priori "rightness" of the decisions of the legislature.
But, as the Kelsen school asserts, the content of law is actually
determined by social forces, and only its form by the legislature.
Hence, whether the citizen may properly expect that the State
or community shall assume responsibility for the torts of com-
munity agents is primarily a social question, which has been
variously answered in different states. As we shall see, in some,
the courts have held the State responsible, as a matter of course,
though usually with qualifications; in others, the legislature has
prescribed responsibility. An examination of the law in Eu-
rope and Latin-America indicates that there has been a continu-
ous development in the direction of the responsible State. The
supporting legal theories will be discussed later; for the present,
3
s WoRM, ORGAiiEI ET SocifTL (iS9G) ; LHL, J. S., AuGusTE C0:tT A:D
Posrrnrvisi (3d ed. 1832) ; LASKI, op. cit. supa note 8, c. 1.
On the various theories of the origin of the State, see GmDrUGs, op. cit.
supra note 10, c. 1; AICKECHNIE, op. cit. supra 2zote 15, at 1-73; WIL-
LOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, cc. 2, 4. On the beginnings of the modern
State, see GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MImDLE AGe (Maitland's
transl. 1900) 87 et seq.; MlAcIvma, op. cit. sapra note 5, at 3-22; Tozzrn,
SOCIAL ORIGINS (1925) cc. 2, 6.
39 Duguit, The Concept of Public Scrrice (1923) 32 YAMI L1W JOUEn.m,%L,
425; Duourr, LAw IN THE MODERN STATE (Laski's trans]. 1919) c. 2.
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it may merely be observed that the social theory is based upon
the degree of security which it is believed the individual is en-
titled to expect in group life. The security of life and acquisi-
tions is one of the main purposes and explanations of social and
political organization; recognition of this fact finds most obvious
expression in the criminal law and in the law of eminent domain.
Apart from taxation, western society has come to realize that
only normal and theoretically equal sacrifices may be asked from
its members for the support of community life; when those sac-
rifices become abnormal or unequal, the burden is and should be
distributed among the community as a whole by making group
compensation'to the injured individual. It became readily evi-
dent that in the operation of the State machine there were
bound to be unusual sacrifices imposed upon some members of
the community, some of them so pronounced and serious, that
had any one else but a State agent committed them there would
have been no doubt of the legal liability of the tort-feasor. It
also became evident that there was no fundamental difference
between the community taking property and injuring property
and between the injury of property and personal injury. Such
differences as were involved in the nature of the injury, in its
"rightful" or "wrongful" character, were worked out by legal
theory and legislation. But a vigorous step in the direction of
responsibility was taken with the invention by lawyers of the
theory of the personality of associations and corporations, in-
cluding the State and its governmental subdivisions.
Legal Personality of the State. Among the Romans, the State,
as a whole, never appeared as a distinct personality. It was re-
garded as the sum-total of the Roman citizens, and later, as the
Emperor. But the State in its property-relations as a fictitious
"person" was a conception familiar to the Roman law. 40 During
the Middle Ages, legal personality was mainly confined to con-
cepts of private law. qierke informs us that the, canonists re-
garded churches as corporate subjects of rights but that it re-
mained for Baldus in the fourteenth century to invoke the con-
cept that in the State, the government or king is the organ or
instrument of an "intellectual and public person," the represented
Commonwealth (ipsa republica repraesentata) which is the true
and permanent subject of the legal relation created. 41 Yet the
concept of legal personality, a term invented to describe a sub-
ject or bearer of legal relations, was not applied to the State in
0 3 GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (1887) 43, maintains
that "persona" was never applied to the State. But to the fiscus, the public
treasury, legal personality was assigned. 2 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUT.
Rfti. RECHTS (1840) § 88.
41 GiERKE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 69. Yet we can readily believe that
the "personality of the State" may have been developed among the Greeks.
GRAY, op. cit. supra note 21, at 49.
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its general character until comparatively modern times, because
it was, in the writings of political scientists, often submerged by
the more mysterious concept of sovereignty. In the late medie-
val struggle between the authority of Church and State and be-
tween ruler and ruled, the search for power was deflected into
political theories associated with the location of sovereignty.
We had the ruler's sovereignty and personality and the people's
sovereignty and personality, but the division tended to becloud
the State's sovereignty and personality. When, however, the
concept of State sovereignty had been fully developed, its unify-
ing tendency did much to strengthen the idea of the legal per-
sonality of the State. The personality of the State as a subject
of rights and duties and other legal relations became entrenched
in continental Europe through the theories of the corporation. 4-
State and corporation were recognized as permanently organized
groups of men, and that instinct for personification which is ele-
mental in human kind assigned to these group-units all manner
of human qualities, including wills and organs. As we sIall see,
the organ metaphor proved useful in explaining how a board of
directors or government could make the entity responsible, not as
agents or representatives, but as an organic part of the whole.
And though we may become impatient of those metaphysical
speculations which contemplate whether the corporation is real
or fictitious--terms which intrinsically are nearly useless because
they mean different things to different people-we shall see that
even this dispute, in the victory of the "real" theory, was helpful
in persuading the Continent that the State as a corporation, pos-
4 2Savigny conceived the artificial as distinguishcd from the natural per-
son as either a "foundation," a corporation, a community, a city, or a State.
Yet he confined his State-juristic person to the State as a fiscus, the State
as a subject of private law relations. 2 Sys=Ei, § SG; "olErtaLai, op. cit.
svpra note 6, at 110. The artificial or fiction theory made for the recogni-
tion of the king or government as the visible representative of eomcthing
invisible and unreal. The sovereignty of the State as a concept was empha-
sized by those who insisted on its "real" e.mstence and personality. Mer-
riam, op. cit. supra note 6, at 111 et scq., citing Gischel, Albrecht, Beselcr,
von Gerber and Gierke. With the "real personality," the "organismic"
theory is often, though not always, associated. Gierke maintained that in
between the State and the individual there are a variety of associations to
which the individual is attached as a member. In the hierarchy of private
corporation, city, commune, State, the State is the highest, but only one
of a series. 2 GIERKn, op. cit. supra note 40, at 41. It was admitted that the
State was distinguished from other corporations by its possession of power
or "sovereign will"--an unfortunate term. The State (or municipal cor-
poration) is now regarded as the bearer of legal relations and the wielder
of power, not the king or monarch or government. The government is the
articulate organ of the State. See 1 Cnm DE2 MLLLDER, CO.aTinUTIO; A
LA TnfoR G9NxAMI, DE I'ETAT (1920) 1. In this study, we have pol:en
of "governmental responsibility," well realizing the theoretical inaccuracy
of the term, because it seemed preferable to use one term inclusive of all
public corporations, and because it was thought not to be misleading.
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sibly sui generis, could and should be liable for "its" torts like
any animate "person."
There was much confusion in the medieval world, as Gierke
informs us, as to the true position of the several political collec-
tive units-the polis or civitas, the realm or regnum and imper-
ium, their relation to one another and to the Empire. But as the
Imperium Mundi gradually evaporated and "sovereignty" was
invented as a postulate of the slowly evolving territorial monarch
and State, now deemed the source of all power (even of that of
feudal lords)-the commune, city and province lost the auto-
nomous intermediate position between the State and the individ-
ual which the Middle Ages had accorded them. The public cor-
poration became a mere part of the State.43
Resistance to this centralizing force of the State in political
theory never was completely abandoned. Its widest form em-
bodied the Germanic notion of the autonomous life of the com-
munity and of fellowships, and though radically impaired by the
Roman canonist theory of corporations, even the latter retained
for the community an independent sphere in public law as a
bearer of legal relations. After the sixteenth century, sover-
eignty, as the distinctive mark of the State, operated to submerge
the independence of all other groups. It remained for the jurists
of continental Europe, reviving the medieval Germanic concep-
tion of the corporation, to prove that the State as a legally-organ-
ized community differed in degree and size, but not in kind, from
smaller communities. Sovereignty as a concept of political
theory, though fully maintained, did not becloud the fact that the
State was also a corporation, a bearer of legal relations, in short,
a "legal personality."
English thought maintained its insular and feudal equipment
long after the Continent adopted the naturalistic approach.
What was on the Continent a difference in degree, remained in
England, a difference in kind.44 The omnipotent sovereign of
the ideal monist State of Hobbes and Austin made all corpora-
tions, public and private, a concession from the sovereign. There
was thus an essential difference betveen the sovereign "person"
and inferior "persons." Even though Pollock can say that "the
greatest of artificial persons, politically speaking, is the State," 41
its treatment in the law is influenced not only by the Hobbesian
and Austinian view of the supra-legal sovereign but by the pecu-
liar historical development which in England for legal purposes
identifies the State with the king.
43 GiERKE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 96 et seq.
44 Ibid., Introduction, x. Probably the modern home-rule movement in
our states, conferring ever larger powers of autonomy on municipal cor-
porations, represents an approach to the old city-state, for it shares much
of the "sovereignty" ordinarily deemed vested in the state.
45 POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (1896) 113.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT
While references are to be found in England to common law
corporations, such as "the parliament of the King and the lords
and the commons," -, the subject of legal relations, the holder
of public lands, the debtor of the national debt, is not the State
but the king, personified into that peculiar conceit of English
law, the "corporation sole." -7 The nation, the public domain,
indeed all Englishmen are incorporated in the king, with the
"two bodies," natural and politic. Coke turned him into an
"artificial person" and opened the abortive controversy as to
which of his two "persons" allegiance is due, and who it is who
does not die, does no wrong and can "think no wrong." The dng
in his political relations in course of time came to be referred to
as the Crown, though in fact, as Maitland has shown us, that
word is used in different senses to describe, on occasion, the gov-
ernment, the people, the State, the king. 45 Maitland prefers the
word commonwealth, with the king as head of this "corporation
aggregate." The dominance of the Crown as the repository of
so many public powers has tended to minimize in English legal
literature the use of suclK words as State to describe the British
body politic. The historical reasons for not personifying the
State in England, and the historical immunities attaching to the
person of the king-transmuted into the Crown, "the living sym-
bol of the unity of the Empire"-had a good deal to do with the
unwillingness to extend the corporate theory in England and
with the refusal to make the State the subject of rights and
duties. Even the colonies are not corporations, though there
seems little reason for not personifying them when we know that
they contract and pay debts, and that most of them can be sued
in tort.9 In England, the political subdivisions are often in-
corporated, as are certain of the principal officers or authorities,
like the Secretary of State for India and the Postmaster-General,
though corporate capacity to hold property is limited or denied
to many. They seem to be those curiosities, corporations sole.
The legal and political relation between England and its colonies
46 Fineux, C. J., in (1522) Y. B. 14 Hen. VIII, f. 3 (Blich. pl. 2) cited by
Afaitland, The Crown as Corporation (1901) 17 L. Q. REv. 131, 133.
4, Aaitland, op. cit. supra note 46; Maitland, The Corporation Sole (1900)
16 L. Q. REv. 335; CARR, GENE %L PnINCLES OF TIE LAW OF Cornomnxa:;s
(1905) c. 4.
4S MITrLAND, op. cit. sitpra note 46, at 140. On the peculiar status of
the State and the crown in English law, see also Moore, The Crown as
Corporation (1904) 20 L. Q. REV. 351. See also 36 Y,= LAW JoUnr.,,, 1,
31 (1926).
49Farnell v. Bowman, 12 App. Cas. 643 (New South Wales, 1837) 1;
Hettihewage Siman Appu v. The Queen's Advocate, 9 App. Cas. 571 (Cey-
lon, 1884); Att'y Gen. v. Wemyss, 13 App. Cas. 192 (Penang, 1SS). To
the effect that the colony or its government has no legal perzonality (pcr-




is so unique that it would be difficult to explain it in purely legal
or even general terms. 50 The constitutions of Canada and Aus-
tralia specifically recognize that the central government of the
federation and of the constituent states may own property, incur
obligations and sue and be sued. -' Incorporation seems an un-
essential condition of personification, 52 and though the Crown
continues to serve as a screen for many purposes, the British col-
onies and dominions seem gradually to be evolving a legal "per-
sonality," by statute, which permits them to become the subject
of legal relations.
In the United States, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Con-
necticut were as colonies chartered or incorporated. The other
colonies, however, also appear to have contracted obligations and
to have constituted entities. There is no doubt that the United
States 63 and the states 54 and territories 6 of the Union are
deemed to be public corporations. Though the American states
had none of the difficulties of England or the British colonies in
establishing their legal personality, nevertheless their historical
origin, the passage of the Eleventh Amendment overruling the
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia 5 and the influence of the analy-
tical school of jurists, served to revive in the United States the
maxims and reasoning on which the dng's prerogative against
suits by his subjects had been sustained or justified. The theore-
tical consequences which had been drawn in Europe from the
5o Allin, Le Statut International des Dominions Britanniqucs (1925)
REV. DE DROIT INT. 760. The relationship will be materially modified by
the conclusions of the Imperial Conference as announced in the Report
published November, 1926 (1927) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 228.
51 The British North America Act and Commonwealth of Australia Con-
stitution Act provide that "Canada" and the "Provinces," and the "Com-
monwealth" and the "States" respectively may own property, incur obliga-
tions and sue and be sued. Moore, op. cit. supra note 48, at 359. See also
Pitt-Cobbett, 'The Crown' as Representing 'the State' (1904) 1 COxoN-
WEALTH L. REV. 23, 145; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 351 ot seq.
52 LAsKI, The Personality of Associations (1916) 29 HAnV. L. REV. 404, re-
printed in FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1921) 139.
5 Dugan v. United States, 3 Wheat. 172 (U. S. 1818); see Miller, J., in
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 206, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 248 (1882): "The
political body corporate which we call the United States of America."
54 State v. Atkins, Fed. Cas. No. 5350 (C. C. Ga. 1866). The term cor-
poration in a statute does not necessarily include the state. Indiana v.
Woram, 6 Hill, 33 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). Dillon is probably correct in say-
.ing that the states are not corporations, in the proper sense of that term,
yet they have practically all the characteristics and qualifications of or-
ganized entities and are deemed by the courts, when suing or being sued, or
owning property, as public corporations. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS (4th ed. 1890) § 31.
55 Territory v. Hillebrand, 2 Mont. 426 (1876). So with the District of
Columbia, cities, towns,'villages, school districts, etc.
56 Supra note 28.
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concept of the corporation and of the legal personality of the
State were apparently not even suggested in the United States.
Legal personality describes simply the conception attached to
the fact that the party or entity in question is the subject of legal
relations. Modern codes, like the Roman law, define legal per-
sons (perso?wte) as all beings capable of acquiring rights or con-
tracting obligations.57 In the case of corporations, it was un-
fortunate to encumber the conception with the quality of a human
being and to endeavor to endow the corporation with a will, in-
terests, etc. Whether the term can be assigned to inanimate
objects, whether the corporation must be a legal person for all
purposes, 53 whether a partnership may not, even in the United
States, be a legal person, are matters with which we need not
concern ourselves. Whether the legal personality of a corpora-
tion can best be described in terms of trust, agency, guardian-
ship, partnership or contract, we need not for present purposes
consider. 5' Whether it is a reality or a fiction, theories which
according to Dewey had a pragmatic origin, is for us less im-
57See, e. g., Argentine Civil Code, art. 30.
58 Note (1926) 10 MINx. L. REv. 59S.
59 fDewey, The Historic Background of Corporatc Legal Pczonalitj
(1926) 35YALLAW JOURNAL, 655; Dieser, The Jristic Person (1903) 57 U.
PA. L. REv. 131, 216, 300; Machen, Corporate Pcrsonality (1911) 24 ]L=W.
L. REv. 253; GELDART, LEGAL PERSONALITY (1924) reprinted from (1911) 27
L. Q. REv. 90; Gray, op. cit. spra note 21, at 49-53, 65 et seq.; SUm0:;OD,
op. cit. supra note 51, at 329, 336, 351; Brown, The Pcrsonality of the Cor-
poration and the State (1905) 21 L. Q. REv. 305; COILMONs, Tin Lra.AL
FOUNDATIONS OF CPITArIwsm (1924) 143 et scq.; Cohen, Comm.un al Ghosts
(1919) 16 JouR. OF PHiLOSOPHY, 673, 678; SAEmtrs, Dn. L PErrzo,-nOLt
JURmiQuE, HISTOME ET TH20RIE (1910) 45, 517, 603; 2 MircHouD, LA THILOfIE
DE LA PERSoNNbT Mom=L (2d. ed. 1924) 5; 1 TnniTsCHnE, PoiTics
(Dugdale and de Bille's transl. 1916) 15; DicEY, THE L.W OF THE: CON-
STrUTION (8th ed. 1915) 37 et seq.; WILOUGnY, op. cit. supra note 8, c.
4; Miceli, La personalit& dello Stato (1926) 1 Thnv. INT. DE LA TunomE Du
Dnorr, 59; KELSEN, ALLGEmn-E STAATsUmHn (1925) §§ 14, 15, pp. CG et
seq.; 1 SCHnDT, ALLGEAIEIXE STAATSLEHRE (1907) § 25, pp. 217 ct seq.;
Affolter, Zur Lehre ron der Persinlichhcit des Staates (1906) 20 Ancurv
F. 6FFExTL. REcHT, 374; 1 CArmt DE MALonrG, CoxmIauTio, 2 LA TIOnmP
G]I~NtLE DE L'ETAT (1920) c. 1; Sander, Dcr Steat 63s Pcrgnlichld it
(1922) STAAT U. RECHT, C. 3; see also Larnaude, La Theorie de la, Pcro.-
?mlitg Morale (1906) 13 REV. Du Dnorr PuTLIc, 57G; Costamagna, Stato Cor-
porativo (1926) 6 Riv. INT. DI FILOSOFIA DCL Dmrr-o, 414; Ducrocq, De le
Personnalitg Civile de lPEtat (1894) 18 Ihv. GEN. DU Dr0IT, 97.
Affolter attacks the conception of a "state person," op. cit. -upra, at 380.
Duguit also denies its validity, and believes that it has done much harm.
1 TRAnt DE DRorr CONST. 478 et seq.; MODrrN FrENCH LEGAL. Piiosor.
(1916) 238 et seq.
Certain philosophers regard some of the theories as to the creation of
the State and the relation between State and law as fiction. See Strauch's
criticism of Kelsen's identification theory in DiE PHnLOsOPnI DES "As.-0"
(1923) 81, and on juristic and personificatory fictions VmAiIGER, Tins
PHILosOPHY OF "As Ip" (Ogden transl. 1925) 34-38, 147.
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portant than the fact that it has been admitted that the corpora-
tion is the bearer of legal relations and can'be held responsible in
tort, both directly for the torts of its "organs," through which
alone the corporation can act, and indirectly for the torts of its
agents or employees, like other principals. That conception hav-
ing, on the continent of Europe, been applied to the State and
its governmental subdivisions as corporations, the interest there
lay in establishing the exceptions to the rule by virtue of the
peculiar functions of governmental agencies. It was the reali-
zation of these exceptional functions which brought about some
modifications in theory. These we shall examine hereafter in dis-
cussing the theories of State reponsibility. At this point, it
seems best to recur to the problem of the relation between the
State and law.
STATE AND LAW
Whether the State is superior to law, inferior to law or iden-
tical and concurrent with law will depend, as a matter of theory,
upon one's conception both of the State and of law. If we ac-
cept Austin's narrow definition of law as the command of an
identifiable sovereign in an ideal State, a sort of master-servant
relationship, perhaps one must draw the conclusion that the State
is an essential condition precedent to law and that the sovereign
is not a subject of law. If we regard law as the rules declared
by courts, regardless of their origin or enforcement, we may
reach a somewhat different conclusion. If we regard public ap-
proval and enforceability as necessary to establish law in a com-
munity, the Austinian conception becomes still weaker. If we
regard law as the uniform, predictable action of societal agents,
perhaps the State becomes unnecessary to the conception of law.
If we regard the State as only one aspect of society and neces-
sarily a legal organization existing by, through and for the law,
the State must be subject to rules of law. So also if the State
is deemed the delegated agent of the community, its principal.
And finally, if we regard as law the publicly-approved rules of
conduct acted upon by states in their external relations, known
as international law, the Austinian limitations disappear. It will
thus be apparent that the problem of the relation between State
and law is inextricably involved in the postulates and concep-
tions associated with the term "law." 6o
THE STATE ABOVE THE LAW
When the territorial State emerged toward the end of the
Middle Ages, there began a movement both in jurisprudence and
6 Few subjects exhibit more clearly than this the correctness of Schu-
ster's assertion that scientific controversies constantly resolve themselves
into differences about the meaning of words. See especially OGDEN AND
RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING (2d. ed. 1927) cc. 1, 2, 6, 9.
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philosophy designed to free the State, as the church had been
freed, from the fetters of the feudal and Germanic conception
that the law controlled every human agency, including the
ruler. 61 Its exponents sought a theory to sustain the dogma
that the State, instead of being either subservient to or identi-
fiable with law, was indeed independent of law, and in fact the
creator of law. Instead of being founded on law, the State, they
asserted, was founded on moral or natural necessity for the pro-
motion of the general welfare. On the other hand, the prevail-
ing medieval theory, with its roots in classical antiquity, insisted
upon the supremacy of law over all human agencies. Even then,
one may surmise, law covered a variety of conceptions. But as
the State could not logically be both above the law and beneath
the law at the same time, the later medievalists, led by Thomas
Aquinas, worked out a compromise which, with minor modifica-
tions, satisfied public demand for a long time. They taught that
natural law was above the State and positive law beneath it, and
the influence of this doctrine is perceptible on the European con-
tinent to this day. The law of nature, though compounded of
the dictates of God and of reason, with the degree of supremacy
between them varying in different periods c was not regarded as
that vague, abstract moral injunction which modern publicists, if
they have any respect for it at all, now attribute to it. In that
day, it was regarded as an obligatory rule of action, compounded
of religious, ethical and moral postulates accepted as fundamental,
which bound every ruler and every people-including the
church-a sort of universal constitutional law r, by which the
validity of every statute and indeed all positive law was to be
tested. If it violated this standard, the human law was to be re-
garded as null and void. So also all societal agents were limited
by the jus Divinu2n and the ins gentizon, as even Bodin admitted.
6 GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 73; GIERiKE, JOIAINNES ALTHUSIUS
(3d ed. 1913) 264.
62 See the excellent note in laitland's Gisr=u, op. cit. opra note "8, at
172-174. On natural law, see Bryce, op. cit. smpra note 15, c. 11; PoumoCK,
EssAYs IN THE LAW (1922) c. 2; Thayer, Natural Law (1905) 21 L. Q. R 1-.
60; Salmond, Law of Nature (1895) 11 L. Q. Rrv. 121; RiTCHIE, NATur.AL
RIGHTS (1894) (reprinted, 1924) cc. 2, 5.
6r3 Bartolus' Civitas in the fourteenth century was for thcoretical pur-
poses an independent sovereign State, the Empire. While sibi p,inccp3,
and having the power to legislate prout sibi placet, this power was subject
to the reservation that the legislation do not run counter to the higher
laws of God, Nature and Nations, to the jus comminzu, to the canon law,
at least in spiritual matters, and to the liberties and privileges of the
Church. See quotations from Bartolus' Commcizt. Dig. Vet., part 1, in
WOoLF, BARToLus or SAssoFERnATo (1913) 152 ct seq.
The conception that "natural law" prevails over written statute is em-
bodied in the "due process of law' clause of our modern constitutions. See
MoTT, DuE Pnoc.ss oF LAw (1926) 47, 57-59, 195, 259, 272, 590 and follow-
ing article.
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As the content of natural law was necessarily disputed, the prin-
ciple became flexible, a fact which doubtless contributed to its
longevity. The rules of natural law became the subject of in-
terpretation, and though the principle survived, the strong mon-
archy or State construed the ever widening rules of positive law
as consistent with its views of the limitations imposed by natural
law. 64
On the other hand, the ruler, the wielder of sovereignty, was
deemed the creator of positive law, the jus civile, which could be
moulded by human will to the demands of utility. This posited
freedom from human law became one of the distinguishing marks
of sovereignty. These advocates of ruler-sovereignty invoked
maxims from the Roman law like quod Prineipi placuit legis
habet vigorem and Princeps legibus solutus est-phrases which
will presently be considered. 65 These ideas, though vigorously
contested by the defenders of republics and popular sovereignty,
exerted a powerful influence on theorists like Bodin, Hobbes and
Austin. The medievalists who enunciated them in order to sus-
tain ruler-sovereignty, interested in promoting a strong centra-
lized State, conceded that in republics the people made the laws
and the ruling magistrates were subject to them. 61 The cham-
pions of popular sovereignty maintained that in every political
society the force of statutes rested on the people's consent and
hence there was no ruler 67 in any society who was above the
laws. One might say that they had with them the weight of his-
torical authority. But from the general admission that there
were two kinds of law, one natural and owing its existence to
sources independent of the State, and one positive, owing its
existence to the State, there arose certain conceptions of funda-
mental rights of the individual, derived from natural law or the
jus gentium which no State could by positive law disregard or
violate, e.g., the rights of private property, which are subject
to expropriation only upon compensation, and the sacredness of
contracts, even the State's. Here we find many of those inhibi-
tions upon royal or State action which, embodied in Magna Charta
and other great English constitutional documents, became known
64 GIRmi, op. cit. supra note 38, at 76, 176.
6 Gierke also refers to the maxim which the Popes applied to themselves:
Omnia jura habet Princeps in pectore suo. This also was invoked on
behalf of the ruler-sovereign. Ibid. 77, 176. This maxim, like its ana-
logue, Error princips jus facit was of Middle Age, not Roman, origin.
GamxE, JOHANNES ALTHUSiuS (3d ed. 1913) 365.
66 GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 38, at 78, 177; GIERKE, JOHANNES AmLTiU-
stus (3d ed. 1913) 266, 267, note 5.
67They appealed to the Justinian code L. 4, Cod. 1, 14, which contains
the famous phrase, mentioned hereafter, Digna vox majestate regnantis
legibus alligatum se principem profiteri. The absolutists deemed this mere-
ly a voluntary concession by the Princeps. GiRKuE, op. cit. supra note 38,
at 177; GIERKE, JOHANNES ALTHUsIUs (3d ed. 1913) 272 et seq.
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to the eighteenth century as the rights of man and are included
in the bill of rights of most written constitutions. And with the
exaltation of the individual as an end in himself, came also the
exaltation of the community, of State power, superior to all posi-
tive law, and of sovereignty, aboriginal, inalienable and inde-
structible.1S The adjustment or reconciliation of these interests,
which are not necessarily antagonistic, lies at the very matrix of
the problems of politics and public law.
The effect of a transgression by the sovereign power of the
limits set by natural law was conceived differently by the two
principal schools of medieval thought. The defenders of the su-
premacy of natural law, reflecting the actual practice of feudal-
ism, regarded a sovereign executive act or statute violative of
natural law as null and void. c9 The apostles of sovereignty
claimed for it formal omnipotence in the legal sphere and re-
garded the claims of natural law as directive only, without bind-
ing force. Proponents of popular sovereignty, introducing anew
the principle of the separation of powers, limited the claim of
omnipotence to legislative acts, and rejected it for executive acts.
This limitation is extremely important in the history of state
responsibility for torts of officers; but the legislative omnipot-
ence, :which so strongly influenced Bodin and Hobbes, became
also, for this school, the key to "rightness." What the law-mak-
ing authority enacted, though it violate natural law, could not be
contrary to "right," for it made "right,"-a doctrine which Jus-
tice Holmes rescues for the twentieth century. Yet it has al-
ready been observed that this professed freedom from the con-
tiol of law, as claimed for the sovereign, expressed a minority
opinion contrary to historical tradition, which regarded the limi-
tations imposed on the State by natural law as "legal" and not
merely ethical limitations, though they might be in given cases
physically unenforceable. Disobedience to positive law violating
these limitations was not only to be condoned but approved.
These ideas undoubtedly exerted their influence on courts in the
interpretation of positive law, and in England they played a
part in the doctrines announced by courts of equity. In the field
63 Medieval doctrine thus laid the foundation for those alleged "inalien-
able and indestructible rights of man" which no State it is assumed may
impair. They are deemed inherent in the "legal State" (Rcclhtzstt) or
"reign of law" as Maitland translates it, and they include the right of the
individual to have recourse against the State when he is wrongfully in-
jured by acts of officials. The denial of this right in England, as a mat-
ter of course, leads Maitland to suggest that theorists might deny to Eng-
land the character of the "reign of law." Gmini, JOwlamizTh ALTnuJSIuS
(3d ed. 1913) 274-5, note 29. GIIE, op. cit- supra note 38, at S1, 178.
See also BRINKMANN, RECENT THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP (1927) 17.
r9 GmRKE, op. cit. svpra note 38, at 84, 184; GmnKE, JOHANNES ALTHU-
srus (3d ed. 1913) 272 and note 22; ibid. 275 and note 30; WoLZU,-nonr1,
DiE GRENZEN DEP POLIZEIGEWALT (1905) § 21.
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of politics, they furnished the support of legal theory to the
popular insurrections and revolutions, following the Reforma-
tion, against royal usurpations. When Machiavelli taught his
Prince that he was free from the restraints of the moral and
natural law, he was deemed by the men of his time to be guilty
of outrage and blasphemy, for the idea was revolutionary. 10
Yet it is the "political" theory of Machiavelli-the touchstone of
absolutism-as opposed to the traditional theory of "natural
law," which is reflected in Bodin and Hobbes and through them
has influenced the analytical jurists of England and America.
Bodin, Hobbes and Austin. If we accept as our major prem-
ise the postulate that law is exclusively the command of an iden-
tifiable, unlimited and indivisible sovereign, we may by a process
of deductive reasoning and by confusing the political sovereign
and the legal sovereign, reach the conclusion that the sovereign
-not necessarily the law-making authority-is above the law.
We must remember, however, that Bodin and Hobbes, embrac-
ing practically unreservedly the conception of illimitable sover-
eignty, thereby departing from many centuries of feudal thought
postulating the responsible king and overlord, were advocates of
an idea they hoped to bring into existence and to justify. They
did not purport to mirror actual facts. Austin, on the other
hand, accepts the irresponsible sovereign and government as ax-
iomatic, though he also was describing his ideal State and none
that he saw before him. To remain logical, he had to deny the
character of law to custom 7'-though applied by societal agents
-to the relations between government and citizen, to constitu-
tional law and to international law. Such a military State and
system of dictatorship as he pictured have probably never existed;
the analogy would probably be repudiated even by Soviet Russia
and Fascist Italy. It is surely out of harmony with the modern
constitutional State and with social facts. People have never
unconditionally obeyed any earthly power. An absolutely un-
limited power in government is unknown. 72 The sociologists
deny Hobbes' assumption that the state of nature is always des-
perate and requires a strong sovereign to hold people together.
They are more inclined to share Locke's view that in the modern
state of western civilization the necessity for mutual co-operation
70 GIERKE, JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS (3d ed. 1913) 279. Machiavelli's views
are found in THE PR INCE (1513) in MORLEY, UNIVERSAL LIBRARY (1883);
see also 2 MACAULEY, ESSAYS (1860), 1-37; MURRAY, Tin PoLiTICAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF THE REFORMTATION (1926) c. 1.
71 See supra note 14.
72 GWDINGS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 36; MACIVER, op. cit. supra note 5,
c. 8. Justice Holmes admits that the theoretically unlimited sovereign is
not in fact unlimited, when he says, in The Western Maid, loo. cit. supra
note 1: "Sovereignty is a question of power, and no human power is un-
limited."
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induces a controlled and reviewable delegation of power to gov-
erning authorities, either by express consent or implied acquies-
cence.73 On the true origin of social organization, it is probable
that sociologists are entitled to greater credence than a priori
political theorists.
Bodin (1576) and Hobbes (1651) with Machiavelli (1513) are
probably the fathers, though not without some earlier philosophi-
cal authority, of the modern notion that the sovereign (king)
is above the law, that sovereignty is "the absolute and perpetual
power of a commonwealth," that the sovereignty is the "supreme
power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by the laws," that
the chief function of sovereignty was the creation of law and
that as the creator of law, the sovereign was not bound by the
law. 7- Bodin did not conceive the State itself as sovereign, but
only one element in it, the king. Law is the "command of a
sovereign using his sovereign power." 7
Not only was this unlimited sovereign power contrary to the
historical development of political theory during the Middle Ages,
but it is quite probable that it was not the prevailing theory even
at the time it was announced. On the continent, the lonarcho-
machs, a school of political writers who based their doctrine on
the necessity for resistance to the religious intolerance which
followed the Reformation, preached the original and inalienable
sovereignty of the people, the contractual origin of government,
the fiduciary character of all political authority, and the feudal
73See LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN:IENT (1690); LETERS CONC=NirmG
TOLERATION (1865) published in his WoRKs (11th ed. 1S12). On Locke's
theories, see LOCKE'S THEORY OF THE STATE in POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN THE LAW
(1922) 80, 102; LASKI, POLITICA THOUGHT IN ENGLAND Fro,,i Loci To
BENTHMAZI (1920); GETTELL, op. cit. supra note 6, at 224, and following
article.
- BODIN, SIX LIMRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (Knolles' English ed. 1600) ezp.
I, c. 2.
On Bodin's theory see HANCKE, E. BODIN, EINE STUDIE tiBr DEN BEGRIF
DER SoUVERAINETXT (1894); DOCK, DER SOUvERXNXTATSBEGRIFF VON BoDn;
Bis ZU FREIDRICH DEni GRosSEN (1897); Dunning, Jean Bodin on Sovrccignty
(1896) 11 POL. Sc. QuAR. 82; Merriam, op. cit. svpra note 6, at 13 et ccq.;
MURRAY, op. cit. supra note 70, c. 4.
75 1 DE REPUBLICA, supra note 74, c. S. Hobbes' view is set out in his
LEVIATHAN (1651) c. 26, § 2: "The sovereign of a commonwealth, be it an
assembly or one man, is not subject to the civil law. For, having power
to make and repeal laws, he may when he pleaseth, free himself from that
subjection, by repealing those laws that trouble him and making of new;
and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free
when he will: nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himself, be-
cause he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to him-
self only, is not bound."
Sir Robert Filmer in his preface to THE ANARCHY OF A LIirTnm on
MixED MoNARCHY (1679), as quoted by Pollock in his ESSAYS IN THE LAW,
supra note 73, at 83, says: "Every Power of malting Laws must be Arbi-
trary: For to make a Law according to Law, is Contradictio in adceto."
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doctrine of the people's right to resist rulers who breach their
trust. 76
But while Bodin, like Grotius, who came closer to developing
the idea of State sovereignty, considered that their ideal sover-
eign was bound by the laws of God, of nature, and of nations11
-not an inconsiderable or intangible limitation on the alleged
supreme power-Hobbes discarded even these limitations. He
thus stands as the exponent of extreme absolutism, and though
political events in England and throughout the western world
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were demon-
strating the inaccuracy, unsoundness and impracticability of his
theories, they nevertheless exercised some influence on abstract
political science. Among political theorists, they survived the ad-
vent and acceptance of modern popular government and the Eng-
lish, American and French Revolutions. In their modern form,
they find accentuated reflection in the writings of Austin, who
exerted considerable influence on English and American analy-
tical jurisprudence.
Austin, beginning with the postulate of an unlimited deter-
minate sovereign dictating law as a command to inferiors, then
demonstrated by a process of deductive reasoning that the sover-
eign law-making power cannot be bound by law, and further-
more, cannot be the subject of legal rights and duties. To hold
that the sovereign State can be legally obligated-State and law-
making power are apparently deemed interchangeable-would
be contrary to his definition of sovereignty. ,8
76 The leader of this school, which also found representatives in France,
Scotland and Spain was the German, Johannes Althusius, whose work has
been rescued for us by Prof. Gierke. See GimEm, op. cit. supra note 70, esp.
264 et seq. On the Monarchomachs see MERRIAM, op. cit. supra note 6, at
17 and authorities there cited; WOLZENDORFF, STAATSRECHT UND NATUR-
RECHT IN DER LEHRE VOM ,VIDERSTANDSRECHT DES VOLXES GEGEN RECIITS-
WIDRIGE AUSlBUNG DER STAATSGEWALT (1916) 95 et seq.
7 BODIN, op. cit. supra note 74, c. 8; 1 GRoTIUs, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS
(Whewell's transl. 1853) cap. 3, § 16.
78 His argument, paraphrased by Campbell, is set out in Lecture VI of his
JURISPRUDENCE (Campbell's ed. 1875). 166: "Every legal right is the crea-
ture of positive law; and it answers to a relative duty imposed by that
positive law, and incumbent on a person or persons other than the person
or persons in whom the right resides .... To every legal right, there are
therefore three several parties; namely, a party bearing the right; a party
burdened with the relative duty; and a sovereign government setting
the law through which the right and the duty are respectively conferred
and imposed. A sovereign government cannot acquire rights through laws
set by itself to its own subjects. A man is no more able to confer a right
on himself than he is able to impose on himself a law or duty. Conse-
quently, if a sovereign government had legal rights against its own sub-
jects, those rights would be the creature of positive law set to its own sub-
jects by a third person or body, who must, therefore, be sovereign over
them. The community would therefore be subject to two different sov-
ereigns, which is contrary to the definition of sovereignty."
786
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY IN TORT
In view of the fact that sovereign states and sovereigns, even
in Austin's day, were continually appearing in court as plaintiffs
and often as defendants, Austin sought to reconcile his theory
with the facts by characterizing the resulting legal relations as
"quasi-legal" rights and duties. Mlany authorities, including
Holland, Salmond, Gray and Brown, -- differ with Austin and
maintain that when the State, through its constitutional organs,
establishes a rule of action determining the relations between
the group-the State or the government acting for it-and the
individual, rules which the courts enforce, that it is fatuous to
deny to these rules the force of law. When Willoughby , seels
to justify Austin against some of these critics by asserting that
they are thinking of the government as subject to law, whereas
Austin is thinking of the State, the answer seems to be that
Austin expressly uses the words "sovereign government" and
is thinking of the law-maling authority, exactly as does Justice
Holmes. Many modern continental writers reconcile the subjec-
tion of the State to law by the theory of auto-limitation or self-
Austin's views were accepted by other English jurists. See MAnunxy,
ELEMENTS OF LAw (6th ed. 1905) § 154; AMos, ScmNcE or LIw (1874)
99. See a full and critical discussion of Austin's views in Browm, THE
AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (1906) c. 1 and Excursus E, p. 331 et -eq.
Austin's view is practically accepted in full by WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. -upra
note 8, cc. 8, 10, and inferentially by Justice Holmes in the passage quoted
supra from Kawananakoa v. Polyblankr. See also GRnnN, op. cit. -tpa
note 13, § 141.
Austin's view is shared in Germany by exponents of the "police" or
"might state" (PolizeiStaat, BeamtcUnstaat, Machtstaat) who maintain that
the individual can have no "subjective rights" against the State. Bun,
DIE SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE (1914) 9 et scq.; DIAYEr
DEuTscHEs VERWALTUNGSRECHT (2d ed. 1914) 110 and note 1. So "sub-
jective rights" of the State, conceived as unlimited force, are denied. But
see JELLINEK, SYSTEI DEE SUBJEKTIVEN UFFENTLICIIEN RECIITIE (2d ed.
1905) 195 et seq., who insists on the possibility of auto-limitation and legal
subjectivity of the State, both to rights and duties. The doctrine of auto-
limitation will be discussed hereafter. Both Seydel (Grnd.-ige cincr
Allgemei;nen Staats-lehre (1873) ) and Van Krieken (Obcr die sogcnazntc
arganische Staats-theorie (1873) ) maintain that law is nothing but
the product of the State, that there are no legal limits to the
"Sovereign Will" but only natural limits dictated by the general interest.
See the views of other publicists cited in SCHMT, ALL mEMtNE SrT s-
LE RE, 176, note 1. See the criticism of these theories in Gierke, Die
GTundbegriffe des Staatsrechts vnd die izeuestcn Staatstheorien (1S74) 30
ZEITSCHR. F. D. GESAMM-TE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr, 153, 265, reprinted 1915.
For Gierke's criticism of Austin's conception of law as a command, Ece
ibid. 181; also MlAcIvER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 257.
7-9 HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1924) 132 et seq.; SALtoND, Junis-
PRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 527; GRAY, op. cit. svpra note 21, at 79-3;
BROWN, op. cit. supra note 78, at 194.
so Op. cit. supra note 8, at 79.
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limitation 81-- a doctrine vigorously attacked, among others, by
Kelsen 82-or by the more far-reaching doctrine of the supremacy
or "sovereignty" of law in every State (Krabbe) or the doctrine
of the Rechtstatt, or "legal state" (Althusius, Gierke, Bihr,
Gneist, Graziano). 83
Kelsen, a distinguished Neo-Kantian legal philosopher of
Vienna, who argues for the theory of the conceptual identity of
State and (pure) law, suggests that the very term State involves
an idea of politics and hence an idea hostile to law, and that this
antithesis is reflected in the views of certain publicists who in
this sense contrast public law with private law. The contrast is
emphasized by Austin. The absolute monarchists also will be
found to maintain the non-legal character of the State as against
the constitutionalists and democrats who assert the supremacy
of law. The non-legal connotation of State may also be deemed
evidenced in such justifications as "reasons of State." 14
It seems, however, over-refined and sterile to argue that be-
cause no one can coerce the State, therefore a right of action
against State or government granted by the legislature and de-
clared by independent courts and regularly carried into effect is
not a "legal" right. We see such statutes as the Tucker Act and
the daily work of the Court of Claims, whose decisions against
the government are uniformly carried into effect by congressional
appropriations. While it is true that no authority could compel
Congress to appropriate the funds necessary to pay the judg-
ments rendered against the United States, a theory or definition
of law which would deny to such rights and correlative duties
the character of "legal" seems too narrow for practical utility. 1
Austin's theory of law and of its relation to the State also leads
him to the conclusion that constitutional law is not positive law.
81 See following article.
82 IKELSEN, DER SOZIOLOGISCHE UND DER JURISTISCHE STAATSBEGRIFF,
KRITISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG DES VERHXLTNISSES VON STAAT UND RECIIT
(1922) 132 et seq. See also Affolter, Studien zum Staatsbegriff (1903) 17
ARcHIV F. oFFENTL. RECHT, 131 et seq., who asserts that only the organs of
the State but not the State can be bound by law. But KELSEN, Op. Cit.
supra, at 182 maintains that this is the same thing. If the organ is bound,
the State is bound.
83 See following article. The views of the principal proponents of the
"legal state" are set out in Sander, op. cit supra note 59, c. 5.
8 4 KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 82, at 138-139.The Ragione di Stato, ratio
status was an invention of Machiavelli. It exerted considerable influence
against the "legal State." GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 299. See also
MOORE, ACT OF STATE IN ENGLISH LAW (1906).
85 Some of Justice Holmes' definitions of law lend support to this con-
clusion. See, e. g., his notable article, The Path of the Law, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS, 167: "The object of our study [law] then, is prediction, the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality
of the courts." "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law" (p. 173).
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Whatever may be true in England, where the constitution con-
sists of a series of customs, not necessarily enforced by societal
agents, 81 though uniformly observed, it seems difficult to char-
acterize in this fashion the written constitutions of the United
States. These are enforced regularly in our courts, against the
United States, the several states, and officials. When the political
scientist affirms that neit her law nor constitution limits the State
or the sovereignty of the State, but only the government, the value
of that distinction is not readily apparent. 87 The citizen is in-
terested in living processes, actions, exercise of power-in short,
human behavior-and when he is guaranteed against certain in-
vasions of private right by constitution and court, we have an-
swered for him the question as to how the State or community
will behave under given circumstances. To tell him that the
passive abstraction known as the State is not limited by the Con-
stitution or by the guaranties mentioned is to posit an empty for-
mula never brought to life. As a matter of fact the federal Con-
stitution lays numerous prohibitions, like the levying of export
taxes, not only on the government but on the people as a whole
and the states are likewise forbidden to pass laws or deny rights
of various kinds-prohibitions which are interpreted and de-
clared by independent courts and are uniformly respected. And
if it be conceded that the people that made one constitution can
unmake it and adopt another, this does not mean that while the
constitution is in force it is not binding on the human beings
that make up the State and for whom the State exists. They may
even have the physical power to override the constitution, if
they oust the lawful authorities, or to amend it in ways not pro-
vided for in the document itself. If this revolutionary power to
upset the constitution is all that is left of "sovereignty," we have
come a long way to find a legal tern to explain an illegal act.
Moreover, it would seem that the case for the legally unlimited
State is for practical purposes surrendered by the admission that
the exercise of sovereignty or the legal power of the State may
be limited by law or constitution. s8
86 DicEm, LAW OF THE CONSTTUTION (8th ed. 1915) 23, calls English con-
stitutional law "conventions, understandings, habits, or practices which,
though they may regulate the conduct of the several members of the sov-
ereign power, of the Ministry, or of other officials, are not in reality laws
at all since they are not enforced by the Courts." It is ex-traordinary that
common law jurists find it so difficult to conceive of societal agents other
than the courts. All organs of government declaring and enforcing rules
of conduct are societal agents and creators or guarantors of law.
8 See the long discussion of this question in WiLOUGHBY, Op. cit. -upra
note 8, at 82 et seq. See also GILCnHST, PaRNciPLEs orFoLiTiCAL Scrnmcs
(1921) 122 et seq. Jhering and Jellinek also deny that constitutions are
laws binding the State. See Duguit's criticism of this view in Mousn
FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1916) 325.
s See WiLLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 91: "All law thus consti-
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If it be conceded that the exercise of the State's power may be
limited and that those human beings who speak for and represent
the State-the officials of the government-may be subject to
legal control, it may well be asked what tangible value there is
in the conception that the abstract State cannot be subject to
law. The law-making authority, the legislature, must be ad-
mitted to be subject to constitutional limitations in the United
States; yet it is this law-making authority that Justice Holmes
exalted to a supra-legal position in order to explain the sover-
eign's immunity from suit-in our humble judgment, a non-
sequitur. And notwithstanding the distinction drawn by the Su-
preme Court between government and State, in order to recon-
cile the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of unconstitutional
-state action with the Eleventh Amendment's immunity from
suit, 811 the fact is that for all practical purposes, the living State
is reflected in the actions of its organs, the government and its
officials. When we speak of the State acting, what is really
meant is that certain human beings having constitutional au-
thority, act in such a way as to bind the group as a whole. To
the extent that their power is subject to law the State's power
is subject to law, in every useful or practical sense. It is for
this reason that we propose to consider the problem of sovereign
immunity from suit not as the abstract State's immunity, but
as the government's immunity, because for the practical purposes
under consideration the two are identical and interchangeable
and because "government" includes the government of all poli-
tically organized communities, federal, state and municipal.
The Roman and Medieval Maxims of Absolutism. In this con-
nection it is proper to suggest that the authority quoted by Justice
Holmes from Bodin to the effect that "one can very well receive
law from another, but that it is naturally impossible to give law
to oneself" was not used by the medieval jurists in any such
sense as Bodin and Holmes assume. As a matter of history, the
tutes a limitation upon the State's legal power in the sense that, only by
a change in that law can the rights which it protects be legally infringed,
and this change in the law, whether by way of amendment or annulment,
if it is to be the act of the State, must be made in the manner which has
been provided for its alteration or repeal." See also ibid. 279; GiEiKE,
DiE STAATS-Tj KORPFORATIONSLEHRE DES ALTERTUMS UND MITTELALTERS (1881)
609.
89 According to this distinction, when the state enacts an unconstitutional
statute or a state officer in its name commits an unconstitutional act, and
enforcement is sought to be enjoined, it is not the State which is sued or
enjoined, but the wrong-doing government or officer falsely speaking in the
state's name. The result thus achieved is to be commended. See Poindex-
'ter v. Greenhow, supra note 5; (1924) 34 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 19-22, where
this distinction is more fully discussed. So, in England, it is sometimes
said that not the Crown, but only the king or officer has committed an il-
legal act. HEARN, GOVERNMENT OF ENrAND (2d. ed 1886) 20; Moore,
The Crown as Corporation (1904) 20 L. Q. REV. 351.
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Roman jurists, the Church fathers and the canonists insist upon
the fact that the Prince is subject to law and the principles of
justice, that he receives his authority from the people-or, after
the sixth century-from God, only on condition that he exercise
his rule justly, for the common good. I Bartolus, the great jurist
of the fourteenth century, uses the phrase to indicate that the
private individual cannot give himself law,01 just as an independ-
ent state cannot establish for itself alone a rule of international
law. The phrase had no reference to the king and his own re-
lation to law. Justice Holmes' quotation from Baldus, Ncmo szo
statuto ligatur necessitative, is taken from a work commenting
on a certain passage in the Roman Code. That passage is one
of the most vigorous expressions from the Roman law affirming
that "the emperor should acknowledge that he is bound by the
laws." 92 Mr. Zane explains the phrase as indicating the obvious
truth that statutes may be repealed and that no lawmaker can
bind his successor. 1' The important phrase which on its face
might indicate the absolute power of the Emperor, Qod priznepi
placuit 1wobet legis vigoren,94 is explained by the clauses follow-
ing it as a privilege to legislate by ordinance within the limits
of the delegation of power conferred upon him by the Roman
people. Through Azo the phrase found its way into Bracton,
and we have already observed that Bracton considered the king
the creation of the law and that the law was his bridle. v;
Another phrase from the Roman law frequently quoted in be-
half of absolutism commences Priwcps lcgibits solitus est. o
Esmein points out that this does not mean that the Roman Em-
9o See CAnLyix, HISTORY OF EDIEVAL POLITICAL TnEoRY IN THE WEST
(1909-22) 4 v.; also following article.
0' BAnToLuS, Quaestio 1, 2, 4, Tractatus Rcpraesaliarmi quoted by Zane,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 453; Austin, op. cit. supra note 78, at 166 (1801
ed., p. 255): "A man is no more able to confer a right on himself than
he is able to impose on himself a law or duty." But does it follow that
a group may not confer a right on an individual member, even against the
group itself, by a constitution enforced by judicial machinery?
92 Code 1, 14, 4: Digna vox juaiestatc 7cgnantif ltgibus alligatum ec
principem profiteri; adeo de auctortatc juris nostra pcndct auctoritas el
re vera majus imperio est submittere legibus p'incipatu n.
9 ZAN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 434, 452.
9 Digest 1, 4, 1 (Ulpian). See GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 285
et seq.
95 2 BRAOTON, DE LEGMUS ET CONSUETUDINES ANGLIAE, 16, 3; I, 8, 5; IM,
9, 3; (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 21 et seq. See the quotations from
Bracton in Justice Gray's opinion in United States v. Lee, supra note 53.
The qualified meaning of Ulpian's phrase, Quod principi placuit, is ex-
plained in 1 CAnLYLE, op. cit. svpra note 90, at 64-06.
9 Digest 1, 3, L. 31 (Ulpian) ; 2 MOMMSEN, ROMII3CHES STAATSR=CHIT (2d
ed. 1876) 728 et seq.; the notable article by Esmein, in EssAYS iN LEGAL
HISTORY (Vinogradoff ed. 1913) 201-224; GmRiE, op. cit. supr7a note '70,
at 281 et seq., cites the views of Zasius, Cujas, Donellus, Pruclanann and
others in explanation of the maxim.
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peror was not bound by the laws, for the contrary was the case
in principle. It merely meant that first the Senate and then
the Emperor himself could exempt the Emperor by special dis-
pensation from the application of certain rules of private law,
not of public law and criminal law, although by virtue of gen-
eral principles legal prosecution against him was not possible. 9,
The maxim appears to have come into France in the thirteenth
century. St. Thomas Aquinas, regarding the power as in its
nature administrative rather than legislative, observed that the
prince cannot properly be said to be under the law, for he must
have the power of dispensing with it. 9s Bodin notes certain ap-
plications in the exemption of the king from the private law
concerning marriage, gifts, etc., and in the matter of public
law, in the power of the king to intervene in the administra-
tion of justice and to decide cases as he saw fit. This danger-
ous, though then not unusual power, contributed to excuse that
arbitrariness of French monarchy, which eventuated in the
lettres de cachet, the loss of a kingly head and the Revolution.
But Bodin, though deeming the phrase a priori a mark of sov-
ereignty, nevertheless does not use it to justify unmitigated ab-
solutism, for he regards the king as subject to the laws of nature
and of God. Bodin does not even suggest that the phrase was
designed to free the king from all the general rules of law, al-
though his dispensing power was necessarily deemed consider-
able.
It was not very clear in the Middle Ages how rigorously the
principle legibus solutus was deemed to free the ruler from the
observance of the law of the land. That the fundamental, so to
speak constitutional laws bound him, at least quod vim directi-
vam, appears to have been maintained by the prevailing political
theory. The advocates of popular sovereignty went further and
in their theory bound the ruler, who for them was no sovereign,
to the observance of all the laws, under sanction. They posited
no potestas legibus soluta even for the sovereign people, the
Monarchomachs claiming that the people were bound by the civil
laws. Il
Although we are informed that the courts resisted attacks
upon these interpretations of the qualified nature of the Roman
maxim, 'l it is important to note that Bodin and his followers
make potestas legibus soluta the essential criterion of sover-
97 Esmein, loc. cit. supra note 96, at 202; 2 MODIMSEN, op. cit. supra note
96, at 729.
98 Carlyle, The Political Theories of St. Thomas Aquinas (1896) 27
SCOTTISH REViEW, 126, 145. As to the views prevailing up to the 9th cen-
tury, see 1 CARLYLE, op. cit. supra note 90, at 164, 171, 229-230, 234.
99 GIERICE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 282-284; Esmein, loc. cit. supra
note 96. TREtUAANN, DIE MONARCHOMACHEN (1895) 59, 75.
100 GiERxE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 285.
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eignty. 101 They even deny that the laws exert any directive con-
trol over him, but that any observance of the law is voluntary on
his part. While some made the concession that the fundamental
laws were ethically binding on him, Hobbes even denied this.
It is striking that this extremist of absolutism and advocate of
autocracy, who never reflected more than a small minority opin-
ion and whose conclusions, if ever true, have long since been
contradicted by the development of political democracy and con-
stitutional law, is resurrected by Justice Holmes as an authority
for what he regards as an axiomatic doctrine operative in our
day. It is strange that the English courts have never thus cited
Hobbes or invoked the grounds advanced by Justice Holmes as
an explanation for the kingly immunity from suit.
On the continent, the extreme consequences of the maxim
potestas legibus solta were at all times vigorously contested,
even by those who adhered to the doctrines of ruler-sovereignty.
Grotius, for example, though willing to admit that the ruler
was not bound by the civil laws, at least in his sovereign capacity,
nevertheless conceded that he was bound by constitutions be-
cause of the natural law doctrine that contracts (constitutions)
were binding. 102 By insisting that the sovereign in his private
capacity was bound by the laws, Grotius marks a notable advance
in legal theory. But while constitutional limitations were thus
deemed binding, the conclusion was clouded in doubt, in the
minds of some, because of the difficulty of enforcing the limita-
tions against the sovereign. The conclusion was further weak-
ened by the suggestion that even breach of contract might be
justified ex causa, that salies publica was a good cause and that
the judge of the question whether public welfare required the
breach was the sovereign. The seventeenth century forerunners
of the modern constitutionalists directed their primary attack
upon the exaggerated extension of the conception of sao-hs publiea
and upon the alleged exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign to de-
termine the fact.10 3 In the following article, the development of
the modern legal and constitutional state in political theory will
be sketched. Here it suffices to note that the issue as to the
nature of constitutional limitations was the center of the intel-
lectual controversy of the eighteenth century. By deeming the
popular will supreme over all laws, including constitutions, the
advocates of popular sovereignty were forced into an absolutist
direction, the ultimate consequences of which were drawn by
Rousseau. But they were dealing with political sovereignty, and
did not profess to release State agents from the control of law.
1.011 BomN, op. cit. supra note 74, c. 8; GiEnKE, op. cit. supra note 70, at
145, 285 and notes.
102 2 GRoTIus, op. cit. supra note 77, cap. 14, §§ 1-2; Glrl, op. cit.
supra note 70, at 287.
103 GIERKE, op. cit. supra note 70, at 288.
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The constitutional doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, working with the tools of natural law, erected consti-
tutional limitations into legal obligations founded on unimpair-
able contract, gave a vis coactiva to constitutional limitations,
enforceable if necessary by a right of resistance, and posited for
every state an implied constitution founded on the natural law
rights of the individual and having as much force as a written
constitution. 104
State Torts. The view that the State is the sole creator of
law has led Justice Holmes to another theory which denies that
the government can commit a tort. Here again Justice Holmes,
now unconsciously, adopts the dogma of Hobbesian absolutism.
Bodin and his successors, while insisting on the power of the
sovereign through his plenitudo potestas to set aside the most
solid of vested rights, yet maintained that in the field of private
law substantive reciprocal rights and duties could exist between
sovereign and subject.105 Hobbes denied this limitation, and in-
sisted that the omnipotence of the sovereign was both formal
and substantive, that the subject could have no right against the
ruler or the ruler any duty to the subject, that "whatsoever he
doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects," even breach of
contract. 106 It is only proper to say that these ideas aroused
universal protest and repudiation, notably by Puffendorf and
his successors, who differed from the constitutionalist school of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries only in deeming the re-
spective rights and duties "imperfect" in character. I'
In a recent case before the Supreme Court, certain vessels
owned or requisitioned by the government' during the war had
collided with certain private vessels. In earlier cases, it had
been held that this gave rise to a lien against the public ship
which could not be enforced while it remained in government
control, but which was enforceable as soon as it reached private
hands. 108 This rule was reversed in 1922 by Justice Holmes,
speaking for a majority consisting of five justices,10 on the
104 Ulrich Huber was the leader of this school. Ibid. 290.
1OsIbid. 293, n. 71; BODIN, op. cit. supra note 74, c. 8, nos. 99-106; 1U,
cc. 3-4.
106 HOBBES, ELEMENTA PHILOSOPHIAE DE CIVS (London ed. 1651) cc. 6, 7,
12; LEVIATHAN (Everyman's ed.) cc. 18-19. Austin defends these views of
Hobbes in his JURISPIUDENCE (2d ed. 1861) 232. See also GiEnKE, op. cit.
supra note 70, at 293.
107 PuFFENDoRF, Du JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (Kennett's ed. 1703)
VII, cc. 8-9; VIII, cc. 1, 5. See references to the "obligatio imperfecta"l
in Thomasius, Gundling and others quoted by GIERK, op. cit. supra note
70, at 294, n. 73.
108 The Siren, 7 Wall. 152 (U. S. 1868) ; The Athol, 1 Win. Rob. 374 (1842);
Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 566, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 217 (1899);
The Florence H, 248 Fed. 1012 (S. D. X. Y. 1918).109 Supra note 1. In the Tervaete [1922] P. 259, the Court of Appeal
reached the same conclusion, but on different grounds. See (1924) 34
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ground that inasmuch as the lien could never have been en-
forced against the government, therefore the original collision
could not have been a "tort" or an act giving rise to a legal
obligation. "The United States has not consented to be sued
for a tort, and therefore it cannot be said that in a legal sense
the United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort
in a legal sense only because the law has made it so . ..
Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced, are ghosts
that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp."
That is, because there is no immediate remedy, there is no legal
injury. "The authority that makes the law is itself superior to
it." There never having been a "tort" creating a lien, there was
none to revive or enforce when the vessel came into private con-
trol.
Is this analytical reasoning convincing? It was vigorously
protested by Justice McKenna, who said, for the minority: "I
reject absolutely that because the Government is exempt from
suit, that it cannot be accused of fault." To solve the legal prob-
lem as to whether liens should arise or survive on the considera-
tion that because the government cannot be sued in the first in-
stance, therefore no operative fact has occurred even potentially
changing legal relations in any respect seems a metaphysical ar-
gument. Immunity from suit may be only temporary or may
be waived, yet the logic of the Westcrn Maid would prevent re-
covery or the application of ordinary rules of law, because, it is
argued, there was no substantive operative fact arising out of
the collision. 110 Yet when the jurisdictional bar is removed by
waiver of immunity, is there any doubt what law is to be ap-
plied? 12" While it may be true that as a matter of private law
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 40. Justice Holmes maintained that the case of The
Siren was only distinguished, because there the government instituted the
suit, but the minority considered The Siren overruled by the new decision.
257 U. S. at 437, 42 Sup. Ct. at 162. In United States v. The Theila,
266 U. S. 328, 45 Sup. Ct. 112 (1924) Justice Holmes sustained a cross-
libel against the United States in language which qualifies the reasoning
in the Western Maid. The Act of March 3, 1925, 43 Stat. 1112, c. 428,
has now made the United States responsible for injuries wrongfully in-
flicted by its public vessels.
110 Judge Hough, in Admiralty Jwisdiction of Late Ycars (1924) 37
HARv. L. RELv. 529, 543, suggests the curious result of Justice Holmes' dic-
tum by substituting the admiralty term "collision" for the exotic "trt,
as follows: "The United States has not consented to be sued for collisions;
therefore, in a legal sense, there was no collision." The decision and the
reasoning of Justice Holmes have also been severely criticized in (1922)
31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 879; (1922) 20 MIcH. L. Irv. 533; (1922) 10 CALF.
L. Rnv. 333; WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT (1927) 134. In
United States v. The Thekla, s vpra note 109, at 340, 45 Sup. Ct. at 113,
Justice Holmes concedes that "the subject-matter is the collision, rather
than the vessel first libelled." cf. 1 CooLEY, Towis (3d ed. 1906) 208.
111 A foreign ambassador committing a common-law crime is immune
from prosecution by virtue of his official position. But when his diplomatic
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the absence of an enforceable remedy justifies the conclusion that
there was no breach of legal duty, still it seems like a non-sequi-
tur to assert that because the government cannot commit a "tort"
in a "legal sense"-a conception of private and not of public law
-therefore it cannot inflict an injury which may give rise to
a maritime lien "against the vessel"-admitting for the moment
this cryptic concept of maritime law. If it is true that there
was no initial wrong, why can the resulting damages be re-
couped or set off when the government institutes the action
against the private vessel? 112 And why is the government sub-
stantively liable in international law? 113 To say that the United
States has not committed a "tort" begs the question. Theoreti-
cally only an individual can commit a tort, although corpora-
tions and governments have been held liable in tort on theories of
agency or representation or on other theories. The commanding
officer of the public vessel doubtless committed a tort, and he
could be successfully sued. An operative fact is thus admitted.
Whether the government for whom in fact if not in legal theory
the officer acted should be accepted as the defendant of record
or should be held responsible for the resulting damages, is a
pragmatic question which receives a different answer in different
countries. While American courts have assumed a tacit refusal
of the government to submit to the jurisdiction of courts, Euro-
pean courts, for the most part, have assumed a tacit consent.
There is nothing fundamental or self-evident, therefore, about
the American rule. Having assumed jurisdiction, it is possible to
find grounds for substantive non-responsibility in particular
cases, as is constantly done in Europe. But to assert, as in Ka-
immunity ceases and he becomes a private citizen within the jurisdiction,
is there any doubt as to his liability to punishment or as to the law applic-
able? See Suarez v. Suarez [1918] 1 Ch. 176; Savic v. New York, 203 App.
Div. 81, 196 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dept. 1922). Justice Holmes has reit-
erated the dangers of analytically logical solutions on numerous occasions.
See, e. g., his dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 106,
44 N. E. 1077, 1080 (1896) : "The true grounds of decision are considera-
tions of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that
solutions can be attained merely by logic and the general propositions of
law which nobody disputes." See also De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos
do Estado, 200 App. Div. 82, 83, 192 N. Y. Supp. 815, 816 (1st Dept. 1922)
and cases there cited; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409 (U. S. 1824)
(liens for seaman's wages); United States v. Wilder, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 694
(D. Mass. 1838) (lien for general average); The Davis, 10 Wall. 15 (U.
S. 1869); United States v. Morgan, 99 Fed. 570, 572 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900)
(lien for salvage).
112 The Siren, supra note 108, a case which Justice Holmes purports not
to overrule. United States v. The Thekla, sutpra note 109.
113 See, e. g., The Sidra (Great Britain) v. United States, British-Amerl-
can Claims Arbitration, under treaty of Aug. 18, 1910, decided Nov. 29,
1921, (1922) 16 AMER. JOUR. INT. LAW, 110. Cf. Kelsen, Ober Staatsunrcoht
(1914) 40 ZTSCHR. F. D. PaV. U. 6FFENTL. RECHT, 1, 95.
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wananakoa v. Polyblank, that because there is no legal responsi-
bility, therefore the sovereign is exempt from suit seems like in-
voluted reasoning. Nor does the immunity from suit or respon-
sibility as a rule of law indicate that the sovereign or state is
above the law. The rule of immunity is the law applied in prin-
ciple in the United States; it is not the law generally applied in
continental Europe. But because it is the rule of our law by no
means proves that a collision cannot give rise to operative facts
which may be invoked to establish a lien and impose enforceable
legal duties when the vessel reaches private hands. The logic of
The Western Maid is too fine-spun to sustain the structure built
upon it.
Yet it is a fact that the Austinians and a number of continen-
tal writers reach the conclusion that the government or State
cannot commit a wrong. They do so without invoking the ques-
tion of suability, either as a condition or a consequence, but on
the simple ground that the State is the test of "rightness," that
its laws or acts cannot be "wrong" because they are its acts and
State action is always rightful, that if wrong is done to private
individuals by officers, judged by the legal standard set by the
State to individuals, that is a personal wrong of officials and not
the State's wrong. The Austinians regarded the suggestion of
wrongdoing by a sovereign State as a contradictio in adjeto. "
There was more doubt on the issue whether the government, con-
sisting of human organs and agents, might not be guilty of
wrong-doing, without implicating the State. This metaphysical
distinction may have satisfied some theorists to permit govern-
mental acts to be challenged judicially by standards of private
law or public law. If so, the State's theoretical superiority to
law was no longer an obstacle to the application of the rule to
the relation between the government and the individual. And
this, in fact, has been the development in continental Europe
and in constitutional states generally. To what extent public
policy requires an admission of pecuniary responsibility on the
part of the group for the torts of group agents is an independent
question receiving a variety of answers both in positive law and
in theory. The theories negativing or justifying such respon-
sibility will be further discussed hereafter; for the present it
may merely be noted that group responsibility has not in Europe
'-AuSTIN, JuRIsprUDENCE, op. 6it. su~pra note 106, at 232 ct -cq. This
is the familiar doctrine that State wrong (Staatsunrccht) is impossible.
JELLINEK, SYSTEi (1905) 196; WILOUGHBY, op. cit. szpra note 3, at 77,
242. See remarks of KELSEN, DER soz. u. D. Jur. STAATSDVLsEcF, 135--16
and op. cit. supra note 113, at 102 ct seq. See also (1926) 36 YALE LAw
JouRNAL, 32.
To the effect that "the government" can commit a tort, see Justice Miller
in Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341 (1879); Mills v. Stewart, 247
Pac. 332 (Mont. 1926).
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been denied on the alleged ground that the sovereign cannot be
sued, or that the sovereign is above the law, or that he cannot be
sued because he is above the law.
The Immunity from Suit. There is some authority for be-
lieving that prior to the time of Edward I, the English king
could be sued. 15 On the western European continent, there is
little doubt that the king and State, ever since the early Middle
Ages, were subject to suit in the king's courts. 116 In Bracton's
day, we have observed that the king was not regarded as above
the law, and that special ways of suing him had been provided. 117
It was only toward the time of Plowden and Coke, supported by
the political theories of Hobbes, that we had the full development
of the regal prerogative and of sovereign infallibility which made
the king immune to ordinary suit and to the application of the
general rules of law.
The explanation that the king dispensed justice in his courts
and could not consistently issue a writ to himself is perhaps the
most plausible ground on which the exemption from suit can be
defended.," It is by no means convincing, for in feudal times
11r 1 HORNE, MIRROUR OF' JUSTICES (Maitland's ed. 1893) Book I, c. 3,
states that at some time between Alfred and Edward I "it was ordained
that the King's courts should be open to all plaintiffs, so that they might
have without delay remedial writs, as well against the King and Queen,
as against any other of the people."
In the Chapter on "Abusions of the Law," it is complained that "the first
and sovereign abuse is that the King is beyond the law, whereas he ought
to be subject to it, as is contained in his oath." MuIROUR, Book V, c. 1.
It is true that the MIRROUa OF JUSTICES is a somewhat discredited authority.
See Maitland's Introduction xi, x, vii. See also Justice Gray, in Briggs v.
Light Boats, 11 Allen, 157, 166 (Mass. 1865); 1 CoIYN'S DIGEST (5th ed.
1824) Action, C. I; VII, Prmrogative, D. 67. See also the quotation made
by Mr. Justice Wilson from Frederick the Great: "all men ought to obtain
justice . . . whether the Prince complain of a peasant, or a peasant
complain of the Prince." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 460 (1793).
-16 See (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL., 19, note 51 and inf ra note 119;
FRISCH, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEiT DER MONARCHEN (1904) 109.
"17 (1926) 36 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 21 et seq.
I'8 Justice Miller, who offered a variety of explanations for a rule which
he regarded as established, suggested, in United States v. Lee, supra note
53, at 206, 1 Sup. Ct. at 249 (1882), a case in which the rule was plainly
evaded by permitting suit and decree in ejectment to lie against two federal
officers holding private property, that the rule may have been adopted in
the United States for a similar reason: "It seems most probable that it
has been adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of pub-
licists, that the Supreme power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall
not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend itself
. . . in those courts." Though admitting the applicability of the rule in
the United States, while denying the validity in the United States of the
reasons advanced in England to sustain it, he evades it by permitting the
suit to run against the government officers for, he says, at 220, 1 Sup. Ct.
at 261: "No man in this country is so high that he is above the law .....
All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law and are bound to obey it."
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the overlord could be sued, at least by peers, in the seignorial
courts, and sovereigns in the European countries had submitted
to the jurisdiction of royal courts. 11 The real reason for the.
exemption was doubtless the desire to escape financial obliga-
tions; and the English king, endowed by his faithful servitors
like Blackstone with the character of a "Superior Being," "sov-
ereignty," "royal dignity," "awful majesty" and "perfection" 120
probably had little difficulty in impressing on any doubter the
blasphemy of any suggestion of subjecting the king to suit at
the hands of the individual. The confusion in carrying out the
distinction, plainly perceived, between the king in his public
and in his private capacity resulted, even after constitutional
government had been established, in according to the Crown, as
the personification of the English State, those personal immuni-
ties and prerogatives which had attached to the theoretically
absolute monarch of Hobbes' and Coke's conception.
What is more surprising is that these mysterious and meta-
physical reasons were permitted to invade the United States to
rationalize the same desire to escape obligations. When the Su-
preme Court of the United States in CkMsolm v. Georgia.121 re-
pudiated the English doctrine that the king's "attribute of sover-
eignty" explains why "no suit or action can be brought against
the King," Mr. Justice Wilson pointed out that "to the consti-
tution of the United States, the term Sovereign is unknown." 1:.
The argument that exemption from suit is based on the fact that
the king cannot issue a writ to himself, has been answered by
the Supreme Court, long after Clishioan v. Georgia, in the state-
ment that no such reason exists in the United States, because
process runs in the name of the President and it may be served
119 On the submission of the lord to feudal courts, see 3 CAnRLYm, op. cit.
supra, note 90, at 30 et seq. On the submission of medieval French dngs
to the courts, see Esmein, op. cit. svpra, note 96, at 210. On submission of
German kings and princes to the courts, see svpra note 116. See also Jus-
tice Wilson in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 459 (U. S. 1793).
120 1 BL. ComI. -241, -242; (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOUnAL, 4. In 7
ConLYN's DIGEST, op. cit. supra note 115, Praerogative D. 73, it is said:
"The King cannot be sued by writ, for he cannot command himself."
121 Supra note 119.
122 At 454. He added at 455-456: "By a State I mean a complete body of
free persons united together for the common benefit to enjoy peaceably
what is their own, and to do justice to others. . . . Is there any part
of this description which intimates in the remotest manner that a State,
any more than the men who compose it, ought not to do justice and fulfill
engagements? . . . A State, like a merchant, makes a contracL A
dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it:
The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice: Upon general principles of
right, shall the former when summoned to answer the fair demands of its
creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new appearance, and to
insult him and justice by declaring, 'I am a SOVEREIGN Stats'? Surely not."
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on the Attorney General. 123 Blackstone's argument that all
jurisdiction implies superiority of power, and his presumably
.clinching question: Who shall command the King, is without
force in the United States for the reasons mentioned by Chief
Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia. If self-government has any
meaning, it signifies community submission to legal processes,
as evidenced by the Constitution. Community agreement to be
bound by rules of law or to submit legal issues to judicial de-
termination, is an adequate assurance of the reign of law, with-
out insisting on the "command" of a Superior Being. Jurisdic-
tion when applied to group submission to courts, may imply
merely a desire to extend the domain of law to the group itself
in its relations with individual members. The suggestion that a
court, as an agent of the State, cannot subject its creator to its
jurisdiction, 12 is merely a convenient bit of rationalization, for
the judicial power, when not constitutionally limited, might have
implied, as did many European courts, a tacit consent instead of
a tacit refusal to submit. Although the argument of sovereignty
was repudiated in 1793, the fact that probably the framers of the
Constitution, and those who ratified it, did not intend to subject
a state to suit in the Federal courts at the instance of a citizen
of another state,'12 5 and the fact that the states were heavily in
123 United States v. Lee, supra note 53.
124 Hill v. United States, 9 How. 386, 389 (1850); SINGEWALD, Tnu Doc-
TRINE OF NoN-SUADILITY OF THE STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1910) 10;
WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 110, at 55.
125 The Constitution provided that the "Judicial power of the United
States shall extend to controversies between two States and to . . contro-
versies between a State and citizens of another State" or "between a State
or the citizens thereof and foreign States or citizens." It was admitted that
a state could be plaintiff and, in Chisholm v. Georgia, expressly held that a
state could be a defendant at the suit of a citizen. Only the citizen's suit
was made impossible by the Eleventh Amendment. States can still freely
be sued without express consent by other states in the federal courts. But
a state may not be sued by its own citizen without its consent either in the
federal courts or in the state courts. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10
Sup. Ct. 504 (1890). Marshall thought otherwise in Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821). The United States is exempt from suit in any
state court, an immunity which the United States Supreme Court will
enforce. Carr. v. United States, 98 U. S. 433 (1878); Stanley v. Schwalby,
162 U. S. 255, 16 Sup. Ct. 754 (1896). See the criticism of Hans. v. Louis-
iana by Wintersteen, (1891) 39 Am. L. REG. 1, 15-19. In the state con-
ventions, the clause of the Judiciary article was apparently not stressed.
It was, however,'questioned on several occasions by opponents of the Con-
stitution. Hamilton, Madison and Marshall evidently maintained that the
clause must be limited to suits in which a state was a plaintiff. THE FED-
ERALIST (1788) No. 81; Fleischmann, The Dishonesty of Sovereigntics
(1910) 33RD REPORT N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 229, 233; Debates in the Vir-
ginia Convention, 3 ELLOTT'S DEBATES (2d ed. 1866) 533, 555. See also
SINGEWALD, op. cit. supra note 124, at 18; WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 110,
at 53. But from an early period set-offs, legal and equitable, have been
allowed in suits by the United States. Gratiot v. United States, 15 Pet.
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debt after the Revolution and feared that payment might be ju-
dicially required, induced them to seek the protection of histori-
cal ma.-ims which might save them from their creditors.= G  Not
only was the monarchical maxim applied in state courts, but the
Eleventh Amendment nullified the effect of Chislobn v. Geor-
gia.12 7 After that, the immunity from suit of state and federal
336 (1841). It may be of interest to note that New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania refused to ratify the Eleventh Amendment, exempting states from
suit in the federal courts by citizens of another state.
126 In Cohens v. Virginia, su~pra note 125, at 40G, Chief Justice Marshall
.says: "It is a part of our history that at the adoption of the constitution,
all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts
might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious objection
to that instrument. . . . Those who were inhibited [by the Eleventh
Amendment] from commencing a suit against a State . . . were per-
sons who might probably be its creditors." This was the first case in which
the doctrine of State immunity from suit was accepted by the United
States Supreme Court. By 1S50, in Hill v. United States, -upr- note 12-1,
at 389, the rule had reached the immutability of a "ma:dm." Though
Hamilton had deemed it "inherent in the nature of sovereignty," the court3,
down to the Civil War, had not attempted to explain or justify it on any
particular ground or theory.
'127 Chief Justice Jay maintained that the English doctrine of sovereign
immunity rested on feudal and monarchical principles which were rcpud-
iated by our states and by the Constitution, and that they were incompat-
ible with our form of government. Sovereignty, as the source of power,
did not rest with a king, adn executive or the government here, but with
the people. Admitting the concept of "state sovereignty," for the sake of
argument, the Chief Justice asked whether it vas incompatible with such
"sovereignty" to be sued. The Constitution said "No." And he ashs, at
472: "Suability by whom? Not by a subject, for in this country there
are none; not an inferior, for all citizens being as to civil rights perfectly
equal, there is not in that respect, one citizen inferior to another"; and
as they could be sued singly, why not as a group, organized in state as well
as in city? He could see no difference between a suit against the 40,000
citizens of the city of Philadelphia and one against the 50,000 citizens of
the state of Delaware. The Chief Justice added, at 477: "It would be
strange, indeed, that the joint and equal sovereigns of this country, should,
in the very Constitution by which they professed to cstabllsh jn.-tice, s9 far
deviate from the plain path of equality and impartiality, as to give to the
collective citizens of one State, a right of suing individual citizens of an-
other State, and yet deny to those citizens a right of suing them.'
He adds, at 479, that the principle of suability "is useful, becauZe
it is honest, . . . because it recognizes and strongly rests on this great
moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man or a mil-
lion, or from a million to one man." To the majority of the court, Jay,
Wilson, Cushing and Blair (Iredell, dissenting) these arguments, taken
together with the express words of the Constitution on the judicial power,
seemed unanswerable. The correctness of Chisholm v. Georgia has been
approved by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, supra note 125,
notwithstanding his stand to the contrary in the Virginia Convention. The
decision was also approved by Harlan, J., in Hans v. Louisiana, xtp;-a note
125. But Justice Bradley in the Hans case disapproved the Chisholm de-
cision and upheld Iredell's dissent.
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government became more deeply entrenched in the American
courts than in those of England, and our main interest lies in
establishing the grounds on which the exemption has been justi-
fied. Down to the Civil War, the courts made practically no
effort to justify the doctrine. They accepted it as established. 128
It is true that constitutions and statutes have expressly conferred
jurisdiction against state or federal government to ever greater
extent, but the effect of the English maxims, now transplanted
and more vigorous than ever, was, as we have seen, to narrow the
judicial interpretations of waivers of immunity.120
Justice Gray, in Briggs v. Light Boats," 10 suggested that "the
broader reason [for exemption from suit] is, that it would be in-
consistent with the very idea of supreme executive power, and
would endanger the performance of the public duties of the sov-
ereign, to subject him to repeated suits as a matter of right, at
the will of any citizen, and to submit to the judicial tribunals the
control and disposition of his public property, his instruments
and means of carrying on the government in war and in peace,
and the money in his treasury.'
The assumptions and fears of JUstice Gray can be easily re-
futed and allayed. It is not the executive power which is sued,
when suit is permitted, but the government as a whole, as the
representative of the organized community. The suggestion that
judgment for the plaintiff would involve the levy of execution
against the public property-state capitol, public buildings, pub-
lic vessels, army equipment-cannot be seriously entertained,
for it has never been proposed to permit the compulsory levy of
execution against the government or its property. This has not
been the consequence of submission to suit either in the United
States or anywhere else. It merely implies that the government
will submit to a money judgment, in proper cases, and in civilized
governments such judgments are paid by legislative appropria-
tion. The danger to "the performance of the public duties of
the sovereign" may be deemed a figment of the imagination.13
128 Cohens v. Virginia, supra note 125, at 412 (Marshall C. J.); United
States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286, 288 (1846) (McLean, J.); Hill v. United
States, loc. cit. supra note 124 (Taney, C. J.) ; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How.
527 (1857) (Taney, C. J.).
129 (1924). 34 YALu LAW JOURNAL, 9 et seq.
130 Supra note 115, at 162. On the professed embarrassment of the State
in the performance of its duties in being compelled to submit its instru-
ments and property to the control of courts to judgment and execution,
see John Marshall in the Virginia Convention, quoted in Hans v. Louisiana,
supra note 125; Mathews, J., in In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164
(1887).
131 Justice Miller, in United States v. Lee, supra note 53, at 206, 1 Sup.
Ct. at 249, denied the validity of Justice Gray's argument, as follows: "As
no person in this government exercises supreme executive power, or per-
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Much has also been made of the indignity of the state being
compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of courts. But compul-
sion is admittedly out of the question. Rather, it may be sug-
gested, that orderly government demands voluntary submission
of the group to judicial processes not only for breach of con-
tract, but in tort. Far from the dignity of the state being im-
paired by such voluntary submission, it is enhanced; 132 the
present refusal to pay obligations, as must other corporate debtors,
is a much more serious attack upon its dignity than its mani-
fested intention to be as law-abiding as it requires its citizens to
be. Its dignity is more seriously prejudiced by Bar Association
addresses on "The Dishonesty of Sovereignties" 133 and by ju-
dicial dicta expressing the public's "deep sense of the injustice
of Governments," 13- than by any voluntary submission to the
courts for the discharge of its legal obligations, measured by the
legal standard applied to other corporate debtors.
As a matter of fact, as has been more fully shown elsewhere, 1
the system of refusing to submit to judicial processes merely re-
sults in a more inefficient and unjust method of dealing with
such claims and obligations. Instead of legal, the claims become
political in character, and in the United States, are pressed on
the legislature for satisfaction. The fact that the federal Con-
forms the public duties of a sovereign, it is difficult to see on what colid
foundation of principle the exemption from liability to suit rests."
As to the suggestion that the instrumentalities of the government would
be interfered with, he added, at 217, 1 Sup. Ct. at 258: "In this connec-
tion many cases of imaginary evils have been suggested, if the contrary
doctrine should prevail. Among these are a supposed seizure of vezZels of
wvar, and invasions of forts and arsenals of the United States. Hypothe-
tical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful im-
agination in regard to almost every law upon which depends the rights of
the individual or of the government, and if the existence of laws is to de-
pend upon their capacity to withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of
the law must fail." Justice Miller in 1882 appears to have advanced con-
siderably in a functional and naturalistic direction from his mechanistic
position of 1868 in Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269 (188).
132Ju~fice Miller, in United States v. Lee, sz'pra note 53, at 200, 1 Sup.
Ct. at 248, remarked: "Nor can it be said that the government is degraded
by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation, because it
is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its
rights as against the citizens to their judgment." So Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in Cohens v. Virginia, supra note 125, at 400, says: "That its motive
[the Eleventh Amendment] was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State
from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before
the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the amend-
ment."
133 Fleischmann, op. cit. supra note 125.
234 Chief Justice Taft, in his dissenting opinion in Sloan Shipyards Corp.
v. U. S. Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549, 573, 42 Sup. Ct. 380, 390 (1922).
235 Borhard, Governmnent Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory
Reform (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 495.
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gress and its Committee on Claims became overwhelmed with
claims arising out of alleged breaches of contract, induced the
Congress in 1855 to establish the Court of Claims and gradually
to extend its jurisdiction and that of the federal courts to cases
of contract, expressed and implied, and over special cases by
special statute. The same reason explains the bill passed by the
House of Representatives on June 10, 1926, permitting suit in
the executive departments and the courts for injuries to person
or property arising out of the negligence or wrongful act or
omission of any officer or employee of the United States acting
within the scope of his employment. Tort claims, though not yet
legally justiciable, are not abandoned by the claimant, nor is the
government relieved from the burden of examining, deciding and,
if equitable, of paying them. But by compelling their conversion
into political claims, the least instead of the most efficient and
just method of dealing with them has been adopted. Two com-
mittees overwhelmed with work, possessing no judicial machin-
ery or equipment for adequate investigation or uniform stand-
ards of determination, are subjected to political pressurefor the
passing of private claims, with the result that a claim may have
to depend for its success or failure on many other factors than
its substantial merits. The judicial method has therefore be-
come an imperative, not merely by reason of the demands of
justice but by reason of the impracticability of dealing with hun-
dreds of claims annually through existing political channels. A
similar development is likely to follow in the states. No one has
suggested that the government has suffered any indignity by
submitting claims to the Court of Claims or by entertaining
them in Congress. Indeed, a legal system which has accus-
tomed states and federal Congresses to the practice of having
courts hold invalid and effectively nullify the most solemn acts
of government, legislative enactments, could hardly assert the
indignity of submitting its administrative activities to judicial
control when they inflict tortious pecuniary injuries on the citi-
zen.
The argument for exemption from judicial processes that "the
supposition that the Government will not pay its debts, and will
not do justice, is not to be indulged," 13; is met by the answer
that it can not only be indulged, but that experience has removed
it from the realm of supposition to that of fact. Jurists of
France and Germany find it almost incredible that a civilized
country should still act on the principle that the government is
immune from the jurisdiction of its courts or that it assumes no
responsibility for the torts of its agents. Our legislative and
136 Justice Miller, in Gibbons v. United States, supra note 131, at 274.
After saying that such a supposition could not be indulged, he added:
"Still less can it be made the foundation for a claim of indemnity against
loss incurred by an individual by acting on such a suggestion."
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judicial history discloses myriads of disallowed claims against
the government which would have resulted in judgments against
other corporate defendants. To this day, interest is not allowed
on the most valid and successful claims against the government.
The supposition that the government will do no injustice, were
it truly a postulate of our government, would long since have
resulted in the waiver of all "sovereign" immunity and the vol-
untary submission to the adjudication of pecuniary claims. The
supposition that the government does not desire to perpetuate
injustice is perhaps the strongest motive behind the present
movement for the abandonment of the English maxims on vhich
immunity primarily rests.
The final argument is that the doctrine of immunity from suit
rests on public policy and practical utility-that it involves a
"policy imposed by necessity," 17 "inherent in the nature of sov-
ereignty." 138 That it is not practical has already been shown.
Whether it is justified by public policy is, to say the least, highly
debatable. It is difficult to believe that a policy which results
in so awkward and unfair a distribution of losses as the present
system, which leaves a victim of official wrong-doing or malad-
ministration to seek relief against a more or less irresponsible
official who may be carrying out orders, who may not be vilfully
at fault or who may be acting under an unconstitutional statute,
represents good public policy. It has no support in the coun-
tries of Europe, and by jurists has been generally condemned.
Foreign practice has shown that it is imposed neither by neces-
sity nor is it inherent in the nature of sovereignty. Aside from
the English practice, which rests on a historical anachronism of
an impeccable personal king, and which is mitigated by the peti-
tion of right, no other country seems to have adopted the policy
that the government cannot be sued in the courts. Consent has
been assumed. This does not mean that every claim or even
every tort claim is recognized and allowed. Indeed, as will be
more fully shown hereafter, many types of injuries are uncom-
pensated, and strict procedural limitations are imposed. But, in
principle, no one is denied the privilege of suing the State or the
government. That remnant of absolutism by a curious turn of
legal history and political theory finds its most vigorous support
in the United States.
Had the United States, after Chishobm v. Gcorgia, not tOken
up the doctrines of Blackstone and feudal England to deny all
privilege of suit, but adopted the rules now applied with respect
to municipal corporations, a more satisfactory solution would
have been found, more in harmony with that of the rest of the
civilized world. That principle is to examine the particular
1s Gibbons v. United States, supraz note 131, at 273.
133 THE FEDERALIST, 1oC. cit. supra note 125.
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function of government, the mismanagement or maladministra-
tion of which caused the injury complained of. If the function
was corporate in nature, i.e., generally speaking, of a type
which a corporation other than government might have under-
taken, responsibility is declared; on the other hand, if govern-
mental in nature, responsibility is denied. In the case of gov-
ernments, these distinctions are far more clearly drawn abroad
than in our law of municipal corporations "-1 and the tendency
is, as governments undertake ever increasing duties, to widen
by interpretation the field of corporate and to narrow the field
of governmental functions.140  It seems unfortunate that we
declined to apply similar rules to state and federal functions in
the United States, for whereas, though enmeshed in inextricable
confusion, we exempt from responsibility municipal corporations
engaged in "governmental" functions, we do not charge with
responsibility states engaged in corporate functions.141 The
ancient symbol of sovereignty is injected to becloud the issue and
to escape what the rest of the world regards as a simple cor-
porate obligation. The anomaly has already been too long-lived
and should be terminated by legislation along the lines of that
now pending in Congress.
A word may be said with reference to Justice Holmes' remark
in Kawannakoa v. Polyblank 142 that "A suit presupposes that
the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course, it
cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the
case with a territory of the United States, because the territory
itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow." What
is meant by "subject to the law invoked?" Courts do not refuse
jurisdiction, because they do not have an existing rule of law
to apply. They make a rule, if necessary. In the case of suits
between the states of the United States, it has been admitted
139 (1924) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 129 et seq.
140 In Germany, art. 131 of the Constitution of 1919 imposes responsi-
bility on the State for the torts of officers, even in the performance of gov-
ernmental functions. This provision will be more fully discussed hereafter.
141 See the excellent article of Freund, Private Claims against the State
(1893) 8 Pon. Sc. QuAR. 625, 638-640, 645-648. On the general subject of
suits against the state in the United States, see in addition to the books
and articles already cited, the following: 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1910) c. 54; WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 466 et seq.; Davie, Suing the State (1884) 18 Ami. L. REV. 814; Binney,
Origin and Development of Legal Recourse against the Government in the
United States (1909) 57 U. PA. L. REv. 372; Binney, Element of Tort as
affecting the Legal Liability of the United States (1910) 20 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 95; Trieber, Suability of States by Individuals in the Courts of
the United States (1907) 41 Am. L. REv. 845; Trickett, Suits against States
by Individuals in the Federal Courts (1907) 41 Am. L. REV. 364; Hadley,
The Eleventh A-mendment (1908) 66 CENT. L. J. 71; (1907) 7 COL. L. REV.
609.
142 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527 (1907).
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that there is no admitted law governing the relations beween
our states, but, as Justice Brewer said, in Kansas v. Colorado 21
the courts have been building up an "interstate common law,"
largely inspired by the rules of international law. When the
government enters into business or corporate relations with in-
dividuals, there would have been no difficulty in finding appro-
priate rules of private and public law to apply, any more than
there is now when the state waives its jurisdictional immunity.
In Europe, as we shall see, there is a good deal of doctrinal dis-
pute as to whether and when the legal relations between individ-
ual and government or State are subject to the rules of private
or public law. But neither in this country nor probably in any
other has a court declined jurisdiction of a case because it did
not know in advance what law to apply.
In the following article, we shall undertake to examine the
theories and postulates which have served to render the State
subject to law or to identify the State with law.
'3. 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (1907). See also opinion of Holmez, J.,
in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 26 Sup. Ct. 268 (190G).
